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Maturity Model for Healthcare Cloud Security 
Opeoluwa Ore Akinsanya 
Management of security across eHealth cloud services is a major organizational 
challenge that healthcare organizations seek to resolve in order to aid their trusts 
in cloud and increase the adoption of cloud services in healthcare. The 
organizational challenges regarding implementations of technical security 
solutions are the major limiting factors for the adoption of the eHealth cloud. As 
such, the aim of this research will focus on developing a security maturity model, 
which will help healthcare organizations to provide a description of the application 
of their cloud security services, and an assessment and improvement of their 
cloud security services over time, as well as to guide and educate relevant 
stakeholders concerning the optimization of their security practices. The identified 
gaps in the review are in the aspect of adoption – the maturity models are either 
too complicated to implement, or they require the healthcare organization’s 
processes to be refined to suit the maturity model’s implementation. The Maturity 
Model for Healthcare Cloud Security (M2HCS) was developed using the Design 
Science Research Methodology (DSRM). It was validated using a formulated 
case study, web-based survey and interviews with practitioners, DSRM 
framework, and feedback from scientific community. The novel contribution of this 
research is the proposal of the model. M2HCS is a high level, holistic model that 
can be used to support and promote healthcare organization’s usable security 
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An important aspect of increasing the adoption of cloud computing in healthcare 
is the comprehensive knowledge and operational implementation of security and 
privacy in eHealth cloud computing (Zhang and Liu, 2010). Notwithstanding the 
potential improvements from the implementation of eHealth cloud services, 
(information) security is still uncertain, and this issue is believed to be more 
complex regarding the cloud services (Almorsy, Grundy and Müller, 2010). 
Cloud computing is a computing and communication model with the potential to 
revolutionise the way systems and services are considered (Mell and Grance, 
2011). For eHealth, the advantages of using the cloud services are clear due to 
the prompt provisioning of computational resources and limited human 
administration effort or service provider interaction. For this reason, cloud 
computing services can deliver eHealth care services in diverse settings and with 
an operational and resourceful approach (Rodrigues et al., 2013). 
As further emphasised by the European Network and Information Security 
Agency (ENISA) in their reports (Catteddu and Hogben, 2009; Haeberlen, and 
Dupre, 2012), the cloud also presents the top security risks that currently 
characterize key limitations for its adoption. An essential aspect of healthcare that 
has improved over the past couple of decades is ensuring health information 
security and privacy, which is a constant process (Solove, 2013). Predominantly, 
it is the responsibility of the healthcare organisation to ensure and maintain the 
security of their healthcare information. Thus, essential developments and 
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methods for this must be scheduled and executed. This is especially vital whilst 
outsourcing computing services in a cloud to guarantee an applicable level of 
security. 
In other critical infrastructure sectors such as energy (Christopher et al., 2014) 
and financial services (Josh and DePierro, 2018), well-designed security metrics 
are valuable in not only facilitating the correct application of different security 
mechanisms provided by a system but also in recognising its weaknesses and 
evaluating the effectiveness of the diverse security mechanisms being executed.  
However, based on the limited adoption of cloud in the healthcare environment, 
there are a small number of research studies aimed at building a security model, 
or a matrix of a common set of security objectives, and quantitative security 
metrics for the eHealth cloud. To the researcher’s knowledge, a particular 
maturity model for security administration in cloud computing for healthcare 
currently does not exist. 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Security is one of the biggest issues in the general cloud computing field, 
particularly as it relates to healthcare. Most healthcare organisations view cloud 
computing suspiciously because of its probable security risks, which has in turn 
limited their adoption of cloud services (Kuo, 2011; AbuKhousa, Mohamed and 
Al-Jaroodi, 2012; Haufe, Dzombeta and Brandis, 2014; Mehraeen et al., 2016; 
Subramanian and Jeyaraj, 2018).  
Management of security across eHealth cloud services is a major organisational 
challenge that healthcare institutions seek to resolve to increase their trust in 
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cloud and their adoption of cloud services. A healthcare organisation’s business 
strategy and goals must be developed and implemented in the context of security. 
Hence, the security risks relating to eHealth cloud must be identified, evaluated, 
and mitigated in the development process (Haeberlen and Dupre, 2012). 
1.2 Research Question 
The significance of maintaining secure and trusted eHealth cloud services has 
resulted in a central question for this research:  
How are the security practises of healthcare organisations actively using cloud 
services assessed? 
To address this research question, this study proposes a novel maturity model 
for assessing security practises in healthcare organisations actively using cloud 
services.  
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives 
The aim of this research is to develop a maturity model for eHealth cloud services 
that can be utilised to describe the application of security services and -an 
assessment of these services over time. It is also intended to guide and educate 
relevant stakeholders concerning the optimisation of security practises. To realise 
the research aim, the following objectives are developed: 
 Identify the major factors limiting the adoption of cloud services in 
healthcare. 
 Demonstrate the knowledge of cybersecurity standards and maturity 
models relevant to ensuring the security of eHealth cloud. 
 Develop a maturity model for healthcare cloud security. 
18 
 
 Validate that the proposed model is applicable in the real healthcare 
environment. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
The Design Science Research Methodology (DSRM) has been adopted for this 
study. In DSRM, the concept of methodology is defined as ‘a system of principles, 
practices and procedures applied to a given branch of knowledge’ (Hevner et al., 
2004). Thus, this adopted methodology in the context of information systems 
involves the construction and assessment of a novel artefact that resolves a 
precise issue in a particular field (Hevner et al., 2004). These artefacts comprise 
constructs (vocabulary and symbols), models (abstractions and representations), 
methods (algorithms and practises), and instantiations (implemented and 
prototype systems) (Hevner et al., 2004). In this research, the proposed artefact 
is a model. 
DSRM entails an iterative process composed of six steps (Figure 1.1) and includes 
rigorous approaches for the construction and assessment of the artefact. These 
phases are explained below: 
 Identification of the problem and research motivation: Describe the 
particular research problem and validate the significance of the solution. 
In this phase, it is essential to identify the state of the problem and to 
evidently validate the significance of the solution. 
 Define the solution’s objectives: Provide a description of the purposes of 
the solution and the state of the art, taking into account what is promising 
and realistic. The solution can be quantitative or qualitative.  
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 Design and development: Construct the artefact, define its anticipated 
service, develop its design, and build the tangible artefact. The artefact 
can be a premeditated piece in which a research contribution is 
entrenched in the design. 
 Validation: This phase compares the proposed objectives of the solution 
to real practical results from the artefact in the demonstration. Well-
implemented validation approaches are used to determine the 
effectiveness, quality, and ability of the planned artefact. The approaches 
include the use of a case study, web-based surveys, and interviews with 
relevant expert practitioners. After this step, researchers can decide if it is 
necessary to iterate back to improve the artefact. 
 Communication: This focusses on the communication of the research as 
a whole, consisting of the problem, objectives, artefact, demonstration, 
and validation, to appropriate audiences. The submission for publications 
and presentation of papers must be undertaken in this phase.  
Even though DSRM is a sequential process, researchers do not have to 
chronologically proceed through each phase or commence at phase 1. Although 
not shown in Figure 1.1 there are several access points through which researchers 
can commence, such as problem identification and motivation, definition of the 




Figure 1.1 Phases of DSRM (Peffers et al., 2008) 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
This research adopts DSRM and is, therefore, organised in accordance with the 
phases recommended by this methodology. The relationship between the thesis 










DSRM PHASES THESIS CHAPTERS 
Identification of problem and research 
motivation 
Chapter 2—Factors limiting the 
adoption of cloud in healthcare 
Definition of the solution’s objectives Chapter 3—Review of cybersecurity 
standards and maturity models  
Design and development Chapter 4—Proposed maturity model 
development 
Demonstration Chapter 5—Validation of the proposed 
maturity model, M2HCS 
Validation Chapter 5—Validation of the proposed 
maturity model, M2HCS 
Communication Chapter 6—Conclusions and future 
work 
Table 1.1 Relationship between the thesis chapters and the DSRM phases 
1.6 Conclusion 
The chapter presents the statement of problem, central question for the research, 
objectives developed to attain the aim of research. In conclusion, the phases 
involved in the chosen methodology, and structure of the thesis are discussed. 
The following chapter will seek to provide initial literature review by discussing 










Chapter Two  
2 Cloud-Based Healthcare in Europe 
Over the last years, health informatics has matured. The field is committed to 
improve quality in health care, provide best evidence at the point of need, and 
also demonstrate benefits across settings, taking advantage of technological 
opportunities and applications (Moen et al., 2013). Technological and medical 
practitioners, publications, and social perspectives shows evidence of eHealth 
evolution but also point out significant eHealth concerns across Europe 
(Kummervold et al., 2008). These concerns vary from the experiences of medical 
practitioners and patients working and living in technology-assisted environments 
(Moen et al., 2011) and eHealth prospects to install, assess, and amend care 
services (Andersen et al., 2008) to internationally oriented policies and 
programmes supporting patient safety (Nøhr & Aarts, 2010), interoperability for 
seamless care (Blobel, Hvannberg & Gunnarsdóttir, 2010), cross-border care 
(Stoicu-Tivadar et al., 2011), and suitable business models for healthcare 
technologies (van Limburg et al., 2011). In these areas, advances in eHealth can 
support future requirements within the healthcare system and improve the quality 
of life of citizens, patients and medical practitioners.  
In Europe, the expressions ‘health informatics’, ‘medical informatics’, ‘nursing 
informatics’, and ‘radiology informatics’ are often used interchangeably with the 
term ‘eHealth’. eHealth can be defined in relation to its broader aim within the 
healthcare system (Eysenbach, 2001) to support medical practitioners in their 
work and continuous lifetime learning, in addition to helping citizens in their 
healthcare management. In addition, eHealth strives for reliable health 
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information (ignoring organisational boundaries) and functioning of healthcare 
systems. This description indicates the potentials of eHealth as a contributor to 
meet challenges for healthcare provisioning and improve healthcare systems 
across Europe (Stroetmann et al., 2011). However, this does not reflect the 
eHealth solutions implemented on the cloud paradigm. 
Relevant literature was reviewed and selected based on its contributions to 
eHealth project implementations and cloud adoption in healthcare with the 
objective of discussing the concept of cloud computing and presenting challenges 
to eHealth in Europe.  
2.1 Health Records on the Cloud 
The secure exchange of Protected Health-related Information (PHI) such as 
healthcare examinations and reports has been an indispensable part of quality 
medical practise. The major reason for sharing PHI is to establish a longitudinal 
healthcare record for the patient through availability of historical examinations to 
compare with current examinations. Hence, a massive increase in healthcare 
records has resulted in a big challenge of data storage for healthcare providers 
as they must ensure excellent care services whilst reducing costs. In addition, 
increased movement of patients between doctors, healthcare organisations, and 
geographic locations has also created a problem in sharing PHI (Mendelson et 
al., 2008; Flanders, 2009; Mendelson, Erickson and Choy, 2014).  
Furthermore, the explosive growth in healthcare records is a result of the 
increasing age of the patient population, new medical technologies such as 3D 
imaging scans, and the increase in the size of patient data studies. Many 
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healthcare organisations do not have sustainable IT resources or storage for 
managing the increasing volume of patients’ data.  
Cost and security are the major evaluating factors for managing healthcare data 
storage and access (Shini, Thomas and Chithraranjan, 2012). As a result, 
healthcare-sharing media has evolved from the use of physical media such as 
hard copy documents to online platforms. However, the use of cloud computing 
for healthcare data sharing also has workflow-related and technical challenges, 
for which this research is a part of the solutions being developed (Mendelson, 
Erickson and Choy, 2014).  
Prompt healthcare data sharing can increase the quality of healthcare. 
Furthermore, elimination of physical media reduces the chances of loss or 
corruption of healthcare data. Unnecessary healthcare costs based on 
duplicative examinations are also eradicated. Hence, these benefits of cloud-
based healthcare data sharing are becoming clear to stakeholders across 
healthcare organisations (Flanagan et al., 2012).  
Lastly, eHealth cloud adopts a principle for healthcare data sharing called remote 
rendering, which ensures the actual healthcare data does not leave the secure 
server in the cloud. Hence, only HyperText Markup Language (HTML) pages of 
the data are downloaded to a healthcare practitioner’s device, solving the 
problem of data incompatibility between multiple systems (Philbin, Prior and 
Nagy, 2011). Further illustrations are seen from the discussion of the related 
reviewed projects in section 2.2. 
Cloud computing is a paradigm for storing and transmitting computing services 
and data over the Internet. It provides self-service access to scalable and shared 
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computing resources such as high computing power and massive storage space 
through communication networks. In addition, it provides an on-demand capacity 
to adjust resources as needed without human interaction. The eHealth cloud also 
provides large-scale data-oriented systems, which meet the needs for medical 
applications, as well as comprehensive access to PCs, networks, smartphones, 
and network-enabled medical devices (Lounis, 2014).  
eHealth cloud can significantly support ‘patient-centricity’ in providing medical 
services. This trend has led to progress in adoption of Electronic Healthcare 
Records (EHR) that provide comprehensive care, patient security, point-of-care 
access to demographic and medical information, and clinical decision support. 
Availability of patients’ data, regardless of the location of the patient and the 
medical practitioners, has become crucial to patient satisfaction and improved 
clinical results. Other primary benefits of e-Health cloud include: 
 Collaboration: Medical practitioners require team-based care delivery, a 
common set of clinical information, and ability to use applications based 
on business model requirements to perform their diagnoses and deliver 
appropriate care services. Cloud technologies support information 
synchronisation and sharing simultaneously. Amongst the early 
achievements of cloud-based collaboration solutions are remote video 
conference visits. 
 Clinical research aid: Pharmacology dealers are adopting cloud with the 
aim of lowering the cost and increasing the development of new drugs. 
The increasing significance of biologics in the research process is making 
cloud computing an increasingly important aspect of Research and 
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Development (R&D). Many pharmacology organisations do not presently 
have the ability to run large datasets, specifically DNA sequencing, as the 
data size overpowers their computers. 
However, despite these benefits, using cloud to store medical data could imply 
moving patients’ data from a trusted environment, such as a healthcare provider's 
infrastructure, to an untrusted environment such as cloud servers, which may be 
located outside the country and under different regulations (Impact of Cloud 
Computing on Healthcare Version 2.0, 2017).  
Despite this risk, e-Health Cloud benefits are further discussed in relation to the 
Europe-based eHealthcare cloud projects reviewed below, as well as the benefits 
of adopting cloud in radiology. 
2.2 eHealthcare Cloud Projects in Europe 
The European Union is leading the world in the development of new technology 
in healthcare, such as electronic patient records and telemedicine. However, 
there exist some practical obstacles to its wider use, according to a study 
conducted for the European Commission (Watson, 2010). 
 Model-Driven European Paediatric Digital Repository (MD-Paedigree) 
Background of the Project 
The Model-Driven European Paediatric Digital Repository project has developed 
a digital repository to store paediatric clinical data for millions of young patients, 
enabling physicians to make more informed decisions. The advanced digital 
repository integrates data from clinical, genetic, and meta-genomic analyses, 
magnetic resonance image and ultrasound image analytics, haemodynamics, 
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real-time processing of musculoskeletal parameters, and fibres biomechanical 
data.  
The platform provides decision support to medical professionals, wherever they 
treat their young patients, by looking for similarities amongst their own patients, 
accessing model-based simulations and predictions, and looking for patient-
centric clinical workflows. It improves the diagnostic precision of paediatricians 
and offers child-specific treatment choices through disease simulations. It also 
employs cloud computing to meet the requirements of high performance and 
supercomputer resources.  
MD-Paedigree is based on two previous, highly successful disease models, 
Health-e-Child (Freund et al., 2006) and Sim-e-Child (Ionasec R., Suehling M. 
and Comaniciu D., 2010). However, it enhances these existing disease models 
by developing robust and reusable multiscale models for safer and more 
predictive, individualised, and effective healthcare in several disease areas. 
Furthermore, it builds on the eHealth platform already developed for Health-e-
Child and Sim-e-Child to establish a worldwide advanced paediatric digital 
repository. 
Aim of the Project 
The aim of MD-Paedigree is to reduce medical errors and suboptimal treatments, 
as well as decrease overall medical costs. It hosts data leveraged by advanced 
analytics tools such as deep machine learning or similarity search to identify 
hidden common patterns. From there, physicians can build personalised models 
to reproduce the individual patient’s physiological parameters, either at a pre-
interventional level or as a result of a given clinical intervention, and categorise 
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patients based on disease risk. Using these tools minimises the chance of 
medical error and increases treatment efficacy, reducing, in turn, the risks of 
complications and relapse, time of recovery, and clinical costs. MD-Paedigree’s 
aims, therefore, are to: 
 integrate and share highly heterogeneous biomedical information, data, 
and knowledge, using best practises from the biomedical semantic web 
 develop holistic search strategies to seamlessly navigate through and 
manage the integrative model-driven info-structure and digital repository  
 jointly develop reusable, adaptable, and composable multiscale Virtual 
Physiological Human (VPH) workflow models 
 support evidence-based translational medicine at the point of care 
 facilitate collaborations within the VPH community (Athena, 2017)  
Benefits and Challenges of the Project 
MD-Paedigree services a broad range of off-the-shelf models and simulations to 
support physicians and clinical researchers in their daily work. It vertically 
integrates data, information, and knowledge of incoming patients in participating 
hospitals across Europe and in the United States and provides innovative tools 
to define new workflows of models towards personalised predictive medicine. 
MD-Paedigree integrates methodological approaches from the targeted 
specialties and, consequently, analyses biomedical data derived from a 
multiplicity of heterogeneous sources, as well as specialised biomechanical and 
imaging simulation models (Pasche et al., 2016).  
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It provides three fundamental functionalities in addition to those of an advanced 
electronic health records registry:  
 Similarity search, allowing clinicians to access ‘patients like mine’ (and find 
decision support for optimal treatment also based on comparative 
outcome analysis) and allowing patients to get in touch with ‘patients 
exactly like me’ 
 Model-based patient-specific simulation and prediction 
 Patient-specific clinical workflows. 
Using MD-Paedigree, doctors can select a highly individualised treatment option 
and receive on-the-spot support in predicting the likely outcome of such 
treatments based on each patient’s personal medical data. This leads to a future 
where child healthcare will become more effective, personalised, and affordable. 
At present, however, although the clinicians have largely recognised the added 
value of the implemented technological solutions, particularly for supporting their 
clinical decision making, the user interface has not yet reached the maturity level 
required for a seamless integration into everyday clinical practise. 
 Simulation Modelling of Coronary ARTery Disease: A Tool for 
Clinical Decision Support (SMARTool) 
Background of the Project 
SMARTool is a project aimed at developing IT solutions to support clinicians in 
the prevention and treatment of heart disease. In particular, the project involves 
the development of a platform to improve risk assessment in patients with 
coronary artery disease, such as myocardial infarction. It also develops 
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innovative IT solutions useful in the prevention and treatment of atherosclerosis-
related diseases, a major cause of mortality and morbidity in all countries across 
the world.  
SMARTool involves a software platform based on cloud computing technology 
for the development of computer models that, starting from non-invasive 
diagnostic imaging techniques, simulate the formation and growth over time of 
coronary plaque, fatty deposits responsible for the narrowing of the coronary 
arteries at the base of atherosclerosis. The platform is used with a perspective of 
personalised medicine; the predictive model adopted, in fact, is integrated with 
all clinical data of the individual patient including genetic factors, medical history, 
risk factors, and environmental factors. The solution is aimed at preventing the 
risk of certain acute complications of coronary artery disease (Parodi, 2016).  
Aim of the Project 
SMARTool develops a Cloud-based Clinical Decision Support System (CDSS) 
for the prevention, management, and stratification of patients with Coronary 
Artery Disease (CAD), Coronary Heart Disease (CHD), and Major Adverse 
Cardiovascular Events (MACE). This is achieved through the standardisation and 
integration of heterogeneous health data and existing patient-/artery-specific 
multiscale and multilevel predictive models (Rocchiccioli et al., 2017). 
Specifically, the SMARTool models are based on the extension of the already 
available multiscale and multilevel ARTreat models for coronary plaque 
assessment and progression over time using non-invasive imaging by Coronary 
Computed Tomography Angiography (CCTA) and are extended with functional 
site-specific assessment (hemodynamically significant plaque through non-
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invasive Fractional Flow Reserve (FFR) computation) and additional 
heterogeneous patient-specific non-imaging data (history, lifestyle, exposure, 
bio-humoral data, phenotyping, and genotyping).  
Benefits and Challenges of the Project 
SMARTool supports clinicians in the diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment of 
patients and optimisation of coronary revascularisation interventions with 
angioplasty and stent insertion. This provides cardiologists, hospitals, and clinical 
centres with an advanced tool for early diagnosis and disease risk assessment 
with the aim of improving, in particular, primary and secondary prevention as well 
as the treatment of acute events such as myocardial infarction (Sakellarios et al., 
2017). 
SMARTool cloud-based platform provides as output a CDSS, assisted by a 
microfluidic device as a point-of-care testing of inflammatory markers for: 
 Patient-specific CAD stratification—Existing models, based on clinical risk 
factors, are implemented by patient genotyping and phenotyping to stratify 
patients with no obstructive CAD, obstructive CAD, and those without 
CAD. 
 Site-specific plaque progression prediction—Existing multiscale and 
multilevel ARTreat tools of CAD progression prediction are refined by 
genotyping and phenotyping parameters, tested by baseline, follow CCTA, 
and are integrated by non-imaging patient-specific data.  
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 Patient-specific CAD diagnosis and treatment—Lifestyle changes, 
standard or high-intensity medical therapy, and a virtual angioplasty tool 
provide the optimal stent type(s) and site(s) for appropriate deployment. 
 Electronic Health Records for Clinical Research (EHR4CR) 
Background of the Project 
The EHR4CR project involves a total of ten companies from the pharmaceutical 
industry, eleven university hospitals, and numerous academic groups and patient 
organisations. Together, the partners established a technical platform that makes 
it easier to link electronic health records to research platforms and networks in 
the healthcare sector. In doing so, a great deal of importance is being attached 
to data protection in particular; the platform is being created in such a way that 
analysis of the de-identified data takes place at an early stage in the relevant 
hospital. All disclosure of person-related data takes place only with explicit 
consent from the patient, who, as previously, is asked by his or her attending 
doctor whether he or she wishes to give his or her consent (Thorp et al., 2015).  
The project has developed a robust and scalable platform that can utilise de-
identified data from hospital EHR systems. The EHR4CR platform supports 
distributed querying to assist in clinical trials’ feasibility assessment and patient 
recruitment. The platform can connect securely to the data within multiple hospital 
EHR systems and clinical data warehouses across Europe to enable a trial 
sponsor to predict the number of eligible patients for a candidate clinical trial 
protocol, to assess its feasibility, and to locate the most relevant hospital sites. 
Applications for internal use are offered to connected hospitals to assist them 
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efficiently identify and contact the patients who may be eligible for particular 
clinical trials. Contrary to other initiatives, EHR4CR designed a solution which is 
compliant to EU legislation and respects the position of hospitals and patients. 
One of the key aspects is that patient-level data never leaves the connected 
hospitals (De Moor et al., 2015). 
Aim of the Project 
An aim of the EHR4CR project is to address the patient recruitment issues 
commonly facing clinical trials. Finding adequate numbers of eligible patients is 
often very difficult and always time consuming in a clinical trial project. The project 
aims to resolve such issues by integrating distributed hospital data resources and 
supporting automated queries. In principle, the enhanced availability of patient 
data will make patient discovery much easier and quicker. The EHR4CR services 
encompass: 
 clinical trial feasibility (distributed queries)  
 patient identification and recruitment (distributing trial protocols to sites 
and collecting follow-up information on recruitment status from sites)  
 clinical trial execution and serious adverse events reporting (mainly EHR 
extraction) 
Benefits and Challenges of the Project 
EHR4CR has shown that it can significantly improve the efficiency of designing 
and conducting clinical trials, reducing time and costs, reducing administrative 
burdens, optimising protocol feasibility assessments, accelerating patient 
recruitment, making study conduct more efficient, and enabling the participation 
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of European hospitals in  more clinical trials and thereby potentially increasing 
research income. The EHR4CR services will offer such benefits to hospitals as: 
 Enhancing the quality of patient-level EHR data for clinical research and 
improving quality of care and health outcomes  
 Generating a new additional income stream by contributing EHR data to 
research  
 Conducting clinical trials more efficiently and increasing hospital 
participation in a larger number of clinical trials  
 Improving hospital recognition as clinical research centres of reference  
 Engaging in a highly dynamic clinical research environment to improve the 
overall quality of care and knowledge transfer 
Principal hurdles identified are interoperability, legal (data protection) and ethical 
issues, and the integrity and trustworthiness of data. Therefore, user groups were 
integrated into the development process at a very early stage (De Moor et al., 
2014). The EHR4CR project was pointing to conditions within which the risks and 
disadvantages of cloud can be mitigated and the opportunities and benefits 
realised. 
Based on findings from the eHealth cloud projects reviewed in Section 2.2, the 
research will further discuss the major challenges identified in Section 2.3. 
2.3 Challenges Limiting eHealth Cloud Adoption 
As seen from the reviewed projects, technology plays an important role in 
healthcare, with cloud computing slowly beginning to make its mark. However, 
despite the important benefits of cloud computing, there are several other 
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significant challenges and barriers to implementation that are responsible for its 
slow adoption (Gupta, 2015; Parker, 2018). 
Healthcare lags compared to most other industries in the adoption of cloud 
technology. Most healthcare organisations are subject to workflows comprised of 
paper-based healthcare archives, duplication of tests, film-based radiological 
images, handwritten summaries, disjointed IT systems, and silos of information. 
Information sharing across these healthcare providers is disorganised, and data 
portability is uncommon. Most healthcare providers depend on obsolete 
technology for their information-sharing needs, and collaboration and 
coordination of care processes are major challenges. Other major challenges 
(Gupta, 2015) limiting the adoption of eHealth cloud are: 
 The digital gap: Some of the best healthcare organisations, in relation to 
adoption of cloud technology and delivery of great quality healthcare 
services, exist in major towns and cities. However, the situation is often 
different in rustic towns, where healthcare organisations can lack even 
basic infrastructure, not just advanced technological infrastructure. This 
highlights the fact that practitioners working in rural towns may have limited 
knowledge about technology in comparison with their colleagues in major 
towns.  
 High costs of adoption and implementation of various dissimilar 
infrastructural mechanisms: The widely accepted fact is that traditional 
technology entails the use of many infrastructures and workforces to 
implement. It is therefore necessary to have a shared and integrated 
network infrastructure, which can form the 'foundation for connected 
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health'. To get the most out of technology investments, healthcare 
organisations require an integrated information technology (IT) network 
that supports various units to team up and communicate effectively. The 
cloud can perform as this foundation for connected health to support a 
variety of complex, dissimilar, and mission-critical applications.  
 Apprehensions about patients’ data confidentiality and security issues: 
This is slowing down the acceptance of cloud technology. As patients’ data 
is located outside the healthcare organisation’s facility, there is 
apprehension about the increased risk of sensitive data being lost or 
misused or getting into the wrong hands.  
 Obtaining the trust of all the stakeholders: This is also a massive 
challenge, yet gaining the trust of both internal and external stakeholders 
is very critical to the adoption of cloud technology. Some healthcare 
providers still do not appreciate the significance of the cloud as an enabler 
of faster, safer, efficient, and more effective healthcare. Thus, providers 
may be reluctant to make investments in cloud technology.  
 Cultural concerns and change management: Implementing cloud 
technology encompasses major modifications in the workflow of the 
healthcare providers. Healthcare organisations have been reliant on 
legacy systems and workflows, many of which are obsolete and not 
efficient. However, many healthcare organisations circumvent updating 
their IT infrastructure because of lack of funds and a trend to avoid capital 
expenditure on new technology. Moreover, healthcare stakeholders have 




Many challenges have been identified and discussed through the review of 
literature and specific projects. However, there is no indication of the relative 





3 Assessing Challenges in Adoption of eHealth Cloud 
The purpose of this chapter is to understand the significance of factors influencing 
the adoption of cloud computing in healthcare. For the purposes of this research, 
in-depth (telephone-based and unstructured) interviews were used to identify 
participants’ feelings and opinions regarding this particular research subject.  
The main advantage of telephone-based interview is that they involve contact 
between researchers and participants and also eliminate nonresponse rates, but 
researchers must developed the necessary skills to successfully conduct an 
interview (Langkos, 2014). In addition, general, open-ended questions are asked 
to allow participant to create opinions before responding, offering flexibility in 
terms of the interactions during the interview and thereby facilitating the 
generation of conclusions regarding the research subject. However, there is 
increased risk that the interview may deviate from the specified research aims 
and objectives. Therefore, the data collection tools involved the use of a semi-
structured questionnaire which was used as an interview guide for the researcher 
and a Dictaphone to record the interviews, when permitted. Certain questions 
were prepared for the researcher to guide the interview towards the research 
objectives, but additional questions were asked during the course of the 
interviews (a detailed interview guide and summary are presented in Appendix E 
and Appendix F - Interview Question Guide). 
During the expert interviews, study participants’ responses were informed by their 
perceptions and experiences, and the methodology for this study guided the 
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interviews. This chapter focusses on presenting and discussing the findings from 
the interviews and comparing them to relevant academic literature  (Whitten and 
Kuwahara, 2004; Bath, 2008; Robert et al., 2009; Ward and Sipior, 2010; 
AbuKhousa, Mohamed and Al-Jaroodi, 2012; Zanaboni and Wootton, 2012; Lian, 
Yen and Wang, 2014). 
3.1 Data Collection Process/Methodology 
A trial interview was conducted for two participants (not part of the four main 
participants) to test the cogency of the research questions and feasible responses 
from intended participants. This data collection phase was initiated with the 
conduct of four in-depth interviews during the timeline in Table 3.1 for a better 
understanding of the subject matter.  
Invitation e-mails containing the research proposal, institutional approval, and 
written consent were sent from August 2016 to the selected participants to get 
their acceptance of participation in the research. More specifically, the researcher 
asked them to participate in the research after explaining the nature and the 
scope of the study. In general, the respondents were willing to participate, and 
the interviews were conducted between September and December 2016. The 
interviews took place over telephone and Skype calls and lasted approximately 
thirty to forty-five minutes. Some interviews were recorded if permitted; otherwise, 
notes were taken to help the researcher analyse the gathered data. It should be 
noted that the conversations were pleasant and flowed smoothly. 
The results of this interview phase are illustrated in section 3.3.2. Open coding 
was used for the in-depth interviews with the help of qualitative analysis software 
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NVivo. Focussed coding was also used with the help of NVivo, which used the 
initial codes as a basis. Memos were written during the entire process of 
collecting and analysing data as this facilitated reflection on the collected data. In 
addition, careful comparisons between respondents’ statements and codes were 
made without being restricted to interpreting participants’ words within a 
framework of properties and dimensions.  
As a framework, this research focusses on a specific challenge with relatively 
high intensity to further understand its impact on the adoption of cloud and the 
underlying reasons through (validation) interviews and support from literature.  
Timeline Data Collection Data Analysis Analysis Method 














with NVivo software 
Table 3.1 Data Collection Process 
3.2 Background of Study Participants 
The study participants were identified through a web search of the appropriate 
people with roles in healthcare record-sharing projects, health IT departments, 
and research contribution in health informatics and the field as a whole. An e-mail 
consisting of the letter of introduction and purpose of the interview were sent to 
the fifty selected participants; however, only nine people responded, out of which 
six agreed to be interviewed and three responded to decline an interview as they 
were not available. One of the six participants subsequently withdrew on the basis 
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that his/her experience did not include cloud eHealth and he/she felt that he/she 
could not provide informed views on the interview questions. In addition, one 
interview response was not included in this analysis because of the time interval 
of the project. The remaining interview responses form the basis of these findings.  
The participants of the study included an IT manager and specialist with over 
thirty years’ experience in the installation of clinical systems in large healthcare 
organisations and maintenance of health information systems. Another 
participant was a researcher involved in a healthcare data-sharing project and 
who worked in an organisation that provided healthcare data-sharing solutions to 
healthcare organisations. The next participant was a professor in a radiological 
sciences department and a top researcher at a healthcare imaging informatics 
group. The last participant had several years of experience in healthcare 
information sharing and led a national healthcare record-sharing project. These 
participants were based in the United States, Australia, Ireland, and Portugal.  
3.3 Scope of Study 
Two themes are the guiding factors for this research, one of which focusses on 
adoption of cloud computing and its application across international borders. 
Based on the complexities involved with international laws on healthcare and a 
lack of relevant contacts in the subject area abroad, this theme is considered to 
be out of the scope of this research.  
Hence, this study’s main focus is the effectiveness of current healthcare security 
practises/culture, which involves  maturity levels of cloud computing adoption in 
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hospitals, deeper understanding of current practises, and challenges in the 
research area.  
This study researches the aspects that influence cloud computing adoption in 
healthcare and their importance and intensity. Careful questioning was used to 
obtain responses that reflect specific challenges, how intense these are 
perceived to be, proposed processes/technology solutions deemed fit for the 
challenge, intensity of organisational culture versus technical solutions available 
in eHealth cloud.  
The results identify the challenges and their intensities, proffered 
solutions/processes from professional viewpoints for the adoption of cloud 
computing in healthcare. Obtaining insights into these challenges from the 
experts’ perspectives gives the study stronger reliability and novelty.  
 Study Question 
The main interview question, which is the focus of this study, is the following:  
 Technical security or organisational culture: Which is the major reason for 
the limited adoption of eHealth cloud? 
Whilst the technical and organisational culture themes are distinct, there are 
significant connections between them. Furthermore, participants’ responses to 
interview questions often addressed more than one theme. In those cases, the 
interview data are described where they appear to fit most logically.  
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 Findings on the Factors Limiting Adoption of eHealth Cloud 
These findings were obtained from the interview participants’ statements, which 
are referred to with the use of direct quotes. To support the opinions of these 
experts in the field, relevant literature were referenced. 
 Technical Challenges 
3.3.2.1.1 Service Reliability and Availability 
‘There are several factors that affect the adoption of eHealth Cloud. Technical 
security is one of the first reasons people cite, but it is not the most important. 
Whilst technical security is a concern, it is not a barrier. Most of the cloud 
providers are regarded as technical cloud architects (TA1), providing all the 
required technical security and access control mechanisms attached to their data 
centres. Hence, the technical security limitations involve integrity and access 
control problems but also include maintaining a resilient backup in case of 
disaster recovery, data/service reliability, systems interoperability, database 
security, transmission speed performance, and configuration flexibility’ stated 
Participant 1. Other technical challenges include the use of earlier/older 
healthcare applications which are not cloud-computing compatible.  
Next is the need to assure the hospital management executives about the 
uninterrupted availability of data when it is transferred to the cloud. Participant 2 
mentioned that ‘Medical practitioners require high availability of the cloud 
services, and service and data availability is crucial for practitioners who cannot 
effectively operate unless their applications and patients’ data are available. They 
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are expected to be available and reliable without interruptions or performance 
degradation’.  
Operationally, the reality is that cloud services could experience failures due to 
software and hardware faults, network faults, security attacks, and natural 
disasters, among many other occurrences. However, medical applications are 
critical and must guarantee very high performance, availability, and reliability 
standards. For this reason, clouds must provide availability and mobility support 
to medical data storage and make processing services accessible through the 
Internet. Although hardware and software installations, upgrades, and 
reconfigurations could be managed without any service interruptions for the 
hospital (Sasse, Brostoff and Weirich, 2001), increased complications still exist 
when managing, securing, and maintaining these dynamic environments based 
on the total dependence on Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) web services, 
Cloud-based Service Providers (CSPs) and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) 
solutions (Ammenwerth et al., 2003). 
Regardless of some widely advertised CSP disruptions, cloud-based services 
have been extraordinarily consistent, which may be nurturing complacency 
amongst hospitals that are very dependent on them. The data compiled by 
AppNeta on the uptime reliability of forty of the largest providers of cloud-based 
services offers some indicators on the performances of CSPs. The total industry 
yearly average of uptime achieved for all the CSPs observed is 99.948 per cent, 
or 273 minutes of unavailability per year. The best providers accomplish 99.9994 
per cent, or three minutes of unavailability each year, whilst the worst providers 
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achieve 99.92 per cent, or 420 minutes of unavailability each year. These 
indicators reveal low outage risk from cloud providers (Thibodeaux, 2011). 
3.3.2.1.2 Web Performance and Latency 
In addition to the challenge of data availability, there is also the challenge of slow 
performance due to low bandwidth, resulting in latency. Remote rendering does 
not always provide sufficient display latency for all medical applications when the 
server must be accessed over the Internet; neither does high bandwidth network 
in a remote data centre overcome the limitations of relatively low bandwidth and 
shared communication links. Such delays in accessing healthcare records stored 
in the cloud may cause dangers to a patient’s life, especially during surgery. 
‘There is the need for fast performance of web solutions and reduced waiting time 
for healthcare records to load. Presently, there are too many vendors and 
solutions which create questions related to availability such as: How do the 
solutions deliver data? Is it in a very quick manner? Is it implemented at an urban 
or remote area? How are delayed data transmissions (latency) over the network 
overcome? Where is the data stored?’ mentioned Participant 3.  
3.3.2.1.3 Disaster Recovery  
This is a part of service reliability that emphasises processes and technology for 
continuation of applications, data, hardware, communications, and other IT 
services in the event of a disaster. The process of creating a disaster recovery 
plan begins with identifying and ranking applications, services, and data and 
defining for each the acceptable downtime before there is a significant life-
threatening impact. ‘Presently, cloud Service Level Agreements (SLAs) provide 
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inadequate guarantees in case of a service outage due to a disaster, and the 
healthcare industry’s requirement of availability and consistency of information 
can be a matter of life and death’ stated Participant 4. This is further supported 
by Cloud Standards Customer Council (2015), according to which the disaster 
recovery provisions of 99%+ SLAs in cloud computing (approximately 4 days of 
downtime a year), may not be adequate  for specific applications and business 
needs (Cloud Standards Customer Council, 2015). 
 The recent closure of Google Health, a cloud application service aimed at 
providing free access to people to store their personal health and wellness 
information, further brings an insight into the risk of adopting public cloud services 
for sensitive data processing. Many people wondered how users of this service 
would either recover their data or be sure that it has been erased when the service 
went offline. It is worth mentioning that uncertainties and lack of transparency are 
present in the cloud framework, such as abrupt failure of services (Huang et al., 
2005). 
Furthermore, ‘counter to the generalisation that a centralised national database 
for healthcare data is less secure and faces more security risks than regional-
based databases, it has been shown from experience that the security risk is 
actually less when using a centralised database for healthcare data than when 
using a regional database. This is because the centralised database is usually 
the Technical Cloud Architect (TA1) type of data centre with full resilient backup 
for disaster recovery, and the access to the data centre is incredibly well 




3.3.2.1.4 Integration and Interoperability  
‘A crucial element to healthcare beyond the IT field is the consistent transmission 
of commonly understood information to enable corresponding patient care’ stated 
Participant 3. Different medical practitioners have different terminologies and 
requirements. To provide an end-to-end system that fully integrates all patient 
information (emergency and in-patient care, pharmacies) entails standardisation 
and interoperability.  
Interoperability involves defining an agreed-upon framework or open protocols 
that allow easy servers and data integration amongst different cloud service 
providers or cloud types, including secure information exchange and services’ 
integration (Dünnebeil et al., 2012). An approach is to use Service-Oriented 
Architecture (SOA), which provides interoperability between the cloud 
components and users by making services easily accessible through 
standardised models and protocols without underlying infrastructures, 
development models, or implementation details (AbuKhousa, Mohamed, and Al-
Jaroodi, 2012). Another approach is to establish a ‘common language’ between 
the systems. As well as having common message formats, the information carried 
in messages will often contain identifiers to allow recipient systems to transform 
and process content intelligently. These common identifiers include common 
coding schemes, classifications, and vocabularies for fields, which are stored 
somewhere accessible by both sides (eHealth Network, 2015; NHS England, 
HSCIC, South, 2015).  
Similarly, there is the challenge of integration; there are several strong security 
solutions, but they are not totally integrated. The development of information 
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systems within separate departments or hospitals resulted in incompatibility 
amongst them and created problems in exchanging or transferring data. To 
resolve this, the use of established electronic record architectures in the design 
of new systems is recommended. Related to this is the lack of standards for 
healthcare data, further complicating the difficulties of transferring and sharing 
data across systems (Anderson et al., 2007; Sharma et al., 2009).  
Certain standards are needed to help facilitate the exchange and storage of data 
within the cloud through mutual and merging components. Hospitals have several 
standards development organisations (SDOs) to develop qualifications and 
standards to support healthcare informatics, information exchange, and systems 
integration. These standards are created for specific domains such as pharmacy, 
medical devices, imaging, and insurance (claims processing) transactions 
(Thilakanathan, 2016).  
‘There are also many healthcare standards, including digital imaging and 
communications in medicine (DICOM), health level seven (HL7), and 
international classification of diseases (ICD). However, there are also differences 
with the implementation of these standards’ mentioned Participant 2. For 
instance, many manufacturers implement DICOM standards differently, so data 
exchange and system interoperability remain challenging. Other challenges 
include incompatibilities with the hospitals’ visions, operational processes, lack of 
transparency of off-loaded data, and applications.  
Finally, the eHealth cloud must be integrated within the clinical workflows 
(business processes, and operations and maintenance (O&M)). In order to 
encourage the acceptance of the eHealth cloud (Moreno-Conde et al., 2015).  
49 
 
3.3.2.1.5 Data Portability  
‘Another challenge that influences hospitals’ readiness to adopt cloud computing 
is the concern about the ability to switch to another cloud vendor or back to the 
hospital database without disrupting operations or introducing conflicting claims 
to the data’ stated by Participant 1. Whilst there are rules and standards to 
provide interoperability amongst cloud providers, they are still inadequate to 
guarantee data, applications, and services portability.  
Data structures and services interfaces differ from one cloud provider to another. 
This can make the migration of data, applications, and services from one cloud 
provider to another or back to its local IT environment difficult. Facilitating 
migration is expensive, especially if there is a large amount of data stored in the 
cloud, as in healthcare. This results in a dependency on a particular CSP for 
service if data portability is not allowed (Thilakanathan, 2016).  
This risk reveals the need for Service Level Agreement (SLA) that discusses 
termination rights, rights to access and retrieve data at any time, termination 
assistance in moving to another provider, and ‘cure periods’ to allow breach of 
contract to be resolved before the provider terminates or suspends services. 
3.3.2.1.6 Data Quality  
In addition, quality is an issue that can affect successful development and 
implementation. The quality, both actual and perceived, of data entered into 
systems and then utilised for healthcare is critical not only for ensuring systems 
are utilised but, more importantly, for the safety and well-being of patients. All 
important decisions regarding a single individual or society’s health are taken 
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depending on the data provided. Hence, the patients’ data stored in the cloud 
must be consistent and constantly in a valid state regardless of any software, 
hardware, or network failures.  
The imperative for patients’ data that are complete and correct will increase as 
lifelong electronic healthcare records are developed (Berner and Moss, 2005), 
for care records developed prospectively as individuals are born, and also for 
those developed retrospectively using data accumulated over an existing 
person’s lifetime to date. Whilst the cloud services must be error-free, they must 
also be easily configurable to meet different needs with minimum effort and cost 
(Youssef, 2008).  
Furthermore, ‘it is important to ensure the cloud provider cannot access or use 
the hospitals’ database/data’ mentioned by Participant 4. This relates to the need 
for efficient security mechanisms with a wide range of security requirements 
amongst healthcare providers. A hospital’s security requirements and policies 
must be fully reflected in cloud services. This service should not lead to high 
computation or communication costs, rendering the cloud economically 
inaccessible (Yang et al., 2010). In addition, the cloud should be flexible in adding 
new needed services to support healthcare processes and requirements whilst 
being easily configurable to meet different needs with minimum effort and cost 
(Vaquero et al., 2009). 
3.3.2.1.7 Access Control Solutions for Clinical Workflow 
A variety of technical issues create barriers to more widespread adoption of 
eHealth cloud. Implementing the paradigm in a clinical setting is more complex 
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than connecting a computer to the Internet or installing software on a system. The 
paradigm must conform to the workflow of the hospital, or the workflow must be 
modified so that the paradigm does not hinder it (Hersh, 2004). To achieve these 
conditions, ‘healthcare administrators are challenged to reach an optimum level 
of security whilst negotiating the trade-offs associated with the expense, 
acceptance, and usability of potential solutions which must respond to the unique 
requirements of the hospital’ stated by Participant 1. 
User authentication mechanisms for data access controls and audit are vital to 
any comprehensive security solution. This is the process of identifying and 
confirming the identity that a user is affirming to be and then granting access 
privileges to resources based on that identity. There is a range of possible 
technical solutions for authentication; these solutions vary in terms of their cost, 
complexity, and assurance levels. The challenge of identifying an optimum 
solution lies in the fact that there are a multitude of forces acting on the design 
decisions and ultimately the adoption of authentication mechanisms (Heckle and 
Lutters, 2011).  
In addition, addressing workflow in data access security is a difficult problem with 
many socio-technical complications. Whilst there has been advancement in the 
development of data access technologies, when the technologies are placed in 
context, they rarely work as intended or are difficult to integrate into the system 
(Orlikowski, 1992). In a healthcare environment, there is a need to balance 
information security without impeding the quality, timeliness, and effectiveness of 
healthcare delivery (Adhikari and Lapinsky, 2003; Bardram and E., 2005).  
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With any authentication mechanism, there is an inherent trade-off between 
security strength and usability (Adams and Sasse, 1999). Mechanisms that are 
easy to use frequently relinquish some security strength, just as those 
mechanisms that offer stronger security often prove more cumbersome to use. 
Mechanisms that provide usability and strength come with greater financial costs. 
Whilst there are many security approaches available, the current authentication 
method of choice for most industries is the traditional username/password pair. 
This method of authentication has the advantage of being both simple and 
economical.  
However, ‘problems arise when medical practitioners must manage a large 
number of unique username/password combinations as they navigate all of the 
applications required for the job’ by Participant 1. Studies have shown that the 
problems with username/password authentication are related to human cognitive 
limitations at the core of the issue (Adams and Sasse, 1999; Sasse, Brostoff and 
Weirich, 2001; Weinshall and Kirkpatrick, 2004). There is an increasing push 
towards stronger, more abstract passwords. However, these are difficult to 
remember, causing users to be reluctant to change them, or they write them 
down, thus subverting the mechanism and causing a security breach. 
Currently, single sign-on (SSO) technologies have emerged as an effective 
means of addressing these authentication challenges. SSO provides 
practitioners the ability to log in to the network once and then be able to navigate 
the countless number of applications seamlessly without the need to enter 
authentication credentials for each application. SSO promises to improve 
usability of authentication for users of multiple systems, increase compliance, and 
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help curb system maintenance costs. However, difficulties emerge in trying to fit 
authentication that is individually oriented into a hospital that is collaborative in 
nature. 
To summarise, SSO authentication approaches improve security by increasing 
user compliance through more usable software; for collaborative technologies to 
be effective, technology must be flexible and adjust to the situation. However, 
‘improving the overall usability of authentication solutions and the effectiveness 
of the technology itself is not enough; the context within which the technology is 
used will greatly affect its usefulness. This is considered one of the reasons for 
the limited adoption of the technology as it is not engineered to fit within the 
healthcare context’ by Participant 4. 
Lastly, these limitations have revealed that there are weightier security 
challenges limiting the adoption of the cloud computing paradigm than only 
access control and integrity. These challenges are beyond security requirements 
only but exist also in terms of functions, operations, users, auditing, management, 
and quality of service requirements. 
 Organisational Challenges 
The challenges between organisational structure and technology have been in 
effect for a long time. It is now well established that when technology is 
implemented, organisational effects will be seen. Thus, organisational and social 
issues are critical in the implementation of information systems (Monrad, 2007). 
Organisational challenges are mostly responsible for the most significant 
obstacles for eHealth cloud (Magrabi et al. 2015). Therefore, identifying eHealth’s 
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organisational problems and designing solutions for these problems can be of 
help for the future of eHealth development.  
The low utilisation of eHealth cloud is a serious problem which is often 
underestimated in terms of organisational issues. Increased adoption of eHealth 
cloud requires answers to these issues of organisational culture resistance, trust, 
and costs, amongst other aspects.  
3.3.2.2.1 Financial Costs 
The rising cost of healthcare throughout Europe has put e-Health high on the 
political agenda; the ‘Europe 2020 vision’ is opening the way for eHealth services 
as these are believed to prospectively reduce public expenditure on healthcare 
(Glazer and Ruiz-Wibbelsmann, 2011; Ranschaert and Binkhuysen, 2013). 
However, the costs of eHealth cloud do not only relate to the initial spending 
required to have an operational implementation but also to the maintenance and 
management costs required to ensure the cloud works as expected. Furthermore, 
‘the first hospitals which chose to implement cloud may enjoy little or no benefits 
since they will need to wait for other hospitals to implement a similar solution 
before communication of medical data can be experienced’ Participant 2. In other 
words, healthcare organisations must calculate the cost and benefits of an 
eHealth cloud before determining the feasibility of adoption (Hill and Powell, 
2009).  
‘Healthcare management executives are constantly looking for cost reduction, so 
IT professionals must balance associated risks with cost involved’ by Participant 
1. Another major factor in adoption is economics; ‘many financial factors drive 
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decisions in healthcare management, for instance, funding from country, state, 
county, or government/nongovernment agencies for the overhead cost of 
implementing the system. This also applies to international efforts, so several 
factors apart from security majorly determine the decision of a hospital’s adoption 
of cloud. Mainly, healthcare executives are looking for ways to cut costs yet 
improve clinical care’ by Participant 1. 
Similarly, financial investment is required to develop, implement, and maintain 
eHealth, and lack of financial support and high initial costs were identified as 
barriers to adopting cloud computing in healthcare (Bath, 2008). Inasmuch as 
hospitals are built to provide healthcare services, they are also commercial 
organisations. In most cases when cloud telemedicine is adopted, stakeholders 
bear the overhead costs, whilst the patients get the benefits. Aspects that require 
attention include how to manage shared resources, production capacity, marginal 
costs, and the use of salaries and charges as proxies for opportunity costs. Also, 
organisational executives may be unconvinced about such expansions, 
particularly when they are satisfied with current methods of working, wish to 
maintain the status quo, and perceive such a change as diverting financial 
resources away from under-resourced clinical care. The diversion of funds 
allocated for local developments was cited as another major reason for the limited 
progress in implementing the cloud strategy (Burns, 1998). 
In addition, healthcare providers require good performance of the cloud services. 
Service performance is critical to healthcare providers; they cannot operate 
effectively unless their applications and patients’ data are readily available when 
required. However, having high performance services can be costly. A trade-off 
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between acceptable performance level and service cost is, therefore, required 
(Lian et al., 2014). Beyond the general belief that trust in data security and privacy 
by users is at the heart of the resistance that healthcare managers have towards 
the cloud (Li et al., 2011), economics and cost have been discovered to be central 
to this resistance.  
Despite that, one advantage achieved from the adoption of cloud computing 
technology is to reduce operating costs and increase the relative operational 
benefits for a given hospital (Premkumar et al., 1999). However, the adoption of 
cloud computing technology is usually a large project and a huge undertaking for 
hospitals. The given hospital or group of hospitals must have a sufficient budget, 
adequate human resource support, ample time, and executive managers’ 
involvement for the adoption of cloud computing technology to be received in a 
positive manner. To that end, these resources are highly critical to the success 
of adoption. 
3.3.2.2.2 Organisational Culture Changes  
The adoption of eHealth cloud will necessitate major changes to clinical and 
business processes and to the organisational boundaries in the healthcare 
industry. This challenge is based on the changes that eHealth cloud will present 
to participants. ‘Hospitals have ingrained culture, policies, procedures, workflows, 
medical processes, and documentation; however, transferring to cloud 
technology may change the traditional ways of sharing data and affect 
employees’ informed by Participant 3, resulting in resistance, which is a common 
management challenge in adopting cloud computing. It is necessary for a plan to 
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implement a smooth transition to the new technology (AbuKhousa, Mohamed and 
Al-Jaroodi, 2012). 
Overall, the healthcare executives and workers are not barriers, but they must be 
educated on this topic and completely understand the requirements and 
challenges in adopting the paradigm. 
3.3.2.2.3 End Users’ Assessment and Trust  
Medical practitioners and patients are the end users of an eHealth cloud. ‘A key 
challenge for its adoption is, therefore, gaining the end user’s trust in cloud 
technology. Various broadcasts on the insufficiency of eHealth have arisen in UK 
news in recent years’ stated Participant 2. A leading example of this was in 2009, 
when the National Health Service (NHS) in England lost thousands of medical 
records (Savage, 2009) due to a lack of security in their computer systems. More 
recently, in July 2011, the NHS was once again in the spotlight when computer 
criminals attempted to gain access to their systems that held patient medical 
records (Lo et al., 2013). Most recently, in May 2017, the NHS was crippled by 
the biggest ransomware (WannaCry) outbreak in history (Graham, 2017). 
From the frequency of these alarming reports on the issues related to e-Health, 
one can understand why patients may feel uneasy about medical facilities storing 
personal data in an eHealth environment. The lack of trust in eHealth is also a 
key issue with medical practitioners. Rather than concerns over security, there 
are two primary reasons for this: resistance to change and lack of education and 
training on the usage of the technology (Vinegar, 2013).  
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Compared with the patients and executive organisational staff, practitioners may 
accept technology decisions differently. Predominantly, practitioners are not 
technology literate in spite of their general competence and learning capacity. 
Having experienced highly demanding educational and specialised training, 
many are experts in their own profession and accustomed to practising in a 
particular way or style similar to that in which they were trained. From prior 
studies, practitioners are usually unenthusiastic about the implementation of 
information systems that interfere with their traditional routines; therefore, they 
seldom give positive responses about the new system (Anderson, 1997; 
Anderson and Aydin, 1997).  
In addition, practitioners usually practise with relatively high autonomy. Thus, 
individual and collective outlooks towards the perceived value of IT systems may 
lead to a more general resistance to using these systems. Such resistance from 
practitioners and executive organisational staff can create further problems after 
systems are implemented, and the limited use of health informatics applications 
has meant that their potential has not always been realised. This emphasises the 
need not only to involve practitioners in the development of systems and the 
interpretation of results but to also provide sufficient explanations and information 
for practitioners to trust the systems (Berner and Moss, 2005). Without support 
from medical practitioners, adoption and use of eHealth will greatly lag; hence, 
their trust in the system is essential. With regards to the patients’ perspective, 
assessment of their approval on the overall healthcare provided by an eHealth 
cloud is equally important. Traditionally, patient approval is the measurement of 
the patient’s opinion of the quality of service provided during treatment within a 
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healthcare environment (Gill and White, 2009). Ensuring positive patient 
satisfaction of eHealth cloud not only proves the feasibility of its implementation 
but may also ensure that wider adoption of eHealth cloud takes place.  
 Legal Challenges 
The use of cloud computing in healthcare results in many legal issues such as 
contract law, intellectual property rights, data jurisdiction, and privacy (Kuner, 
2010; Ward and Sipior, 2010; Pearson, 2009). Amongst them, ‘data jurisdiction 
is a major concern’ stated Participant 1. Physical storages for the cloud are 
typically widely distributed across multiple jurisdictions, each of which may have 
different laws regarding data security, privacy, usage, and intellectual property 
(Kuner, 2010; Ward and Sipior, 2010). For instance, privacy acts such as Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) can be applied to 
data only within the United States, whilst the Personal Information Protection and 
Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) operates within Canada. The cloud provider 
could (without notice to the hospital) move part of the hospital’s information to 
another jurisdiction, resulting in patients’ data having more than one legal location 
at the same time, with contradictory legal consequences (Health information 
privacy, 2015; Justice Laws - Privacy Act, 2016; USA PATRIOT Act, 2001). 
There is also a requirement for additional harmonisation of legislation regarding 
the processing of health data in cross-border healthcare services, and a 
European directive is obligatory to guarantee the safety of patients. For example, 
the European Society of Radiology has many publications in which they have 
expressed their concerns about teleradiology and have also provided guidelines 
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and recommendations for the development and use of teleradiology services 
within the EU (ESR, 2012). 
3.3.2.3.1 Standards  
There are still no clear or adequate guidelines for clinical, technical, and business 
practises of healthcare in the e-context. This includes the lack of standards for 
medical informatics, policies, interoperability, and transmission methods in 
eHealth cloud. Hence, the participants in eHealth cloud do not have a foundation 
to start offering and using it. Thus, more issues and problems may occur due to 
this shortage, and as a result, technical, social, and ethical concerns will arise (Lo 
et al., 2013).  
Generally, ‘there are some standards and classifications for health information 
systems, some of which can be adopted for the eHealth cloud’ informed by 
Participant 3. An example is the International Classification of Diseases’ tenth 
revision (ICD-10) issued by the World Health Organization (WHO), (International 
Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems ICD-10, 2010; 
NHS, 2011b), which defines a medical classification list for the coding of 
diseases, signs or abnormal findings, complaints, social conditions, and external 
causes of injury or diseases. Another classification is the Systematized 
Nomenclature of Medicine (SNOMED), which was designed as a detailed 
categorisation of clinical medicine for the purpose of storing and/or retrieving 
records of clinical care in human and veterinary medicine (NHS, 2011b). The 
eHealth cloud developers can agree on adopting some of these defined 




However, even if the eHealth cloud adopted some of these defined standards 
and classifications for improved data sharing amongst several healthcare 
organisations, legal issues such as liability and concerns related to patient privacy 
and safety would yet remain unsolved (Pohjonen, 2010). This legal insecurity is 
certainly one of the main reasons for the rather slow implementation of eHealth 
cloud in Europe. For instance, it should be clear for patients if the physician 
providing the services is properly licenced and accredited and in which country 
the liability of the physician is to be addressed: the country where the patient is 
examined or the country that is the residence of the physician. 
3.3.2.3.2 Data Privacy Legislation 
The governments of various countries in the mature markets are currently faced 
with resolving and managing the collective needs for privacy and freedom of 
information. On 1 July 2012, the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (the 
independent European advisory body on data protection and privacy) adopted an 
opinion on cloud computing (WP196) that is expected to be used as a standard 
guide for cloud requirements in the EU (ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION 
WORKING PARTY, 2012). It stated that the cloud client should be considered as 
the ‘data controller’, whilst the CSP acts as the ‘data processor’, except where 
the CSP processes the personal data for its own purposes. An effect of this 
statement is that the applicable law will usually be the legislation of the country in 
which the cloud client is established rather than the place where the CSPs are 
located. 
Although the European Commission's standard contractual clauses offer 
satisfactory safeguards, they do not apply to a situation where the CSP acting as 
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a processor is established in the EU and uses non-EU subcontractors. Because 
the location of data is abstracted in cloud computing, a CSP could move data 
between countries and jurisdictions without the awareness of the data owner. In 
fact, data could reside in more than one country, each having a different legal 
stance on privacy. As a result, the European Commission is working on a 
prohibition of corresponding disclosures of personal data to be included in the 
future General Data Protection Regulation, subject to specific exceptions.  
The following section will discuss the influence of these findings on the research. 
3.4 Influence of the Identified Challenges Limiting eHealth Cloud Adoption 
At the onset of this study, the researcher had the hypothesis that technical 
challenges were the major factors inhibiting the rate of adoption of cloud 
computing in healthcare, particularly in Europe. However, after the preliminary 
interview, it was realised that technology does not have as much impact as a 
factor in inhibiting the adoption as organisational challenges do.  
Based on this research and interviews, the findings were confirmed to be realistic 
in the subject area and were later supported by a literature review. This reveals 
that there is a need for in-depth research in this subject matter. Furthermore, 
available security solutions for utilising eHealth cloud technology would not solve 
the challenges presented in this chapter, but assessing their organisational 
implementation could reassure end users that the eHealth cloud will continue to 
follow an inspirational model of good working practises for years to come. 
With the increasing pressures of citizens’ healthcare management and current 
financial crises such as rising costs of services and innovations leading to more 
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funds required for healthcare trusts, especially in the UK, this research is 
considered valuable in helping to avoid huge financial debts. It also provides 
information and knowledge to the healthcare chairs and staff who are currently 
considering the adoption and implementation of eHealth cloud computing to 
maintain a high standard of healthcare services for citizens (Horsley, 2015). 
3.5 Chapter Conclusion 
To implement eHealth cloud, the financial costs to be allocated depend on what 
the challenges are, their criticalities, and their impact. However, most costs will 
be allocated to organisational challenges regarding security, which includes 
workflow and implementation. 
Hospital executives are the primary decision makers regarding cloud adoption, 
and project managers must satisfy their requirements when implementing an 
eHealth cloud (Whitten and Mackert, 2005). Hence, it can be inferred from the 
interview findings that the organisational challenges regarding implementation of 
technical security solutions are amongst the major limiting factors for the adoption 
of eHealth cloud. As such, the next chapter focusses on developing a theoretical 
framework for the proposed novel security maturity model to help healthcare 






4 Theoretical Framework for Proposed Maturity Model 
With the aforementioned challenges in healthcare, the need to adopt and 
implement cloud computing in this field as a whole is becoming more apparent. 
This research proposes solutions to assess the identified challenges with high 
impact with a view of capitalising upon the benefits presented by cloud 
computing, its universal connectivity, scalability, and flexibility. These promising 
features offer a new opportunity of achieving affordable healthcare services and 
reducing personnel strain in hospitals.  
4.1 Systematic Literature Review 
To gain awareness of the existing research about this subject, a systematic 
literature review (SLR) was performed. In this SLR, two compounded search 
terms, ‘cloud security maturity model and electronic healthcare’, were used at two 
electronic information sources specific to healthcare and computer science/cyber 
security. This resulted in a set of important sub processes and quality factors and 
a clarification of the research gap. The choice of the two search terms was based 
on a literal analysis of the research title and the intention was to identify resources 
from both electronic healthcare and cyber security domains. 
 Systematic Literature Search Approach  
The research methodology ensured logical and systematic reviews based on 
concept-centric frameworks. The latter were employed since they allow detailed 
explanation of the process, are comprehensive in scope, and provide an 
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opportunity for reproducibility (Webster and Watson, 2002; Okoli and Schabram, 
2010). The research parameters and search terms were formulated according to 
a predefined set of rules of SLR, which informed the combination of search terms. 
To expand on the identification phase, the SLR with five main stages (Duff, 1996) 
was adopted because its processes follow a clear and repeatable protocol (Figure 
4.1).  
 
Figure 4.1 Systematic Literature Search (Duff, 1996) 
During the first stage, a broad set of search terms was developed to guarantee a 
result of domain-related literature. To achieve this, a conceptual taxonomy was 
adopted that arranged search terms in a framework of their synonyms, broader, 
and narrower terms (Duff, 1996).  
Secondly, the search statement was formulated. The identified maturity models 
are included if they define steps towards improvement in maturity of capabilities. 
In addition, the domains in which the maturity models are used should be cyber 
security, IT in healthcare, or a combination of before mentioned. The best search 
strategies adopted were the proper use of Boolean operators, which combined 
both natural language and phrasebook (Duff, 1996). For this research, the search 
statement formulated included  
(‘Cloud security maturity model’ or ‘cyber security maturity model’ and ‘electronic 
healthcare’ or ‘capability maturity model in electronic healthcare’).  
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In the next stage, the search parameters were established. Four major 
parameters were used in this research: formats of literature such as books, 
journals, conference publications (formal); subject domains of research 
conducted (disciplinary); the year when the research was conducted (temporal); 
and the geographical area in which research was conducted (spatial) (Duff, 
1996). Presently, there is relatively limited literature available in the field of cloud 
security maturity assessment in healthcare; therefore, to ensure all the maturity 
models compared are rooted in well-structured concept, exclusion criteria is 
developed. The identified maturity models are excluded if the maturity models 
have no information regarding the models and theory they are based upon. The 
established disciplinary parameter excluded research with a primary subject 
domain that was not cybersecurity. There were defined cybersecurity maturity 
models. However, this research did not include studies conducted in developing 
countries to define spatial parameters. Lastly, cybersecurity is a fast-evolving 
field, so a temporal constraint was defined to include only relevant literature, 
starting in 2010.  
The search for information sources was the fourth stage. The main information 
resources were obtained online. To keep the research rigorous, three proxies of 
search engines were included, all with a different focus. For this research, the 
information sources specified for the healthcare were Springer and PubMed. The 
information sources for computer science and cybersecurity literature were the 
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), Elsevier Science Direct, IEEE 
Computer Society Digital Library (CSDL), and the Association for Information 
Systems electronic library (AISeL). Lastly, Google Scholar was included with a 
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general focus, and this generally contains the most articles and may in some 
cases include publications of the other chosen databases; however, these could 
not be accessed through the proxy used for Google Scholar and are thus 
identified separately.  
Finally, the references of these publications were recorded and included in the 
bibliography. In Figure 4.2, the overview of the search and exclusion process is 
provided. The process consists of identification, screening, eligibility, and the 
analysis of included publications. (The identification process was previously 
discussed.) The screening included the titles, abstracts, and meta-data. Based 
on the screening of the title and abstract, out-of-scope literature was excluded. 
Lastly, the literature sources were fully read. Based on their content, it was 
decided whether they were to be included or not. Exclusion of records was done 
based on the following arguments:  
 The full article was not available through the used proxies.  
 The article consisted of a thesis.  





Figure 4.2 Search and Exclusion Process 
Despite adopting a rigorous approach to review the publications, there is still the 
risk of having overlooked important contributions by excluding cybersecurity 
maturity frameworks from the search because these could not produce 
measurable outputs to determine cybersecurity posture. Since the research field 
is still emergent in nature, it makes sense that results are currently ongoing in 
terms of research. However, assessing the quality of the frameworks and models-
in-progress is an arduous and error-prone task. By limiting the review, there was 
a focus on mature research adhering to the high-quality standards and workflow 
dynamics of healthcare, which, in turn, ensures quality in the reported findings.  
The subsequent sections discuss cloud security in general and, specifically, in 
healthcare. Afterwards, the challenges in maturity assessment of security in 
cloud-based healthcare, need for a cloud security maturity model in healthcare, 
and gaps in knowledge are identified. Lastly, publications about cybersecurity 
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standards and cloud security maturity models/metrics, in general and in 
healthcare, are reviewed. 
4.2 Cloud Security 
Security is considered essential for cloud computing as a robust, feasible, and 
versatile solution. There is a vital concern about crucial security and legal 
challenges for cloud computing, including service availability, data confidentiality, 
provider lock-in, and reputation fate sharing. These concerns are not based only 
on existing problems directly inherited from adopted technologies but also on new 
problems derived from essential cloud computing features like scalability, 
resource sharing, and virtualisation. The difference between these features can 
be further distinguished by examining the definition of the essential cloud 
computing characteristics proposed by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) (Mell and Grance, 2011), which also introduces the service 
models for services (software as a service [SaaS], platform as a service [PaaS], 
and infrastructure as a service [IaaS]) and deployment (private, public, 
community, and hybrid).  
Due to the ever-growing interest in cloud computing, there is an explicit and 
continuous effort to evaluate the current developments in security for such 
technology, considering both problems already identified and possible solutions. 
An authoritative reference in the area is the risk assessment developed by the 
European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) (Catteddu and 
Hogben, 2009). Not only does it list risks and vulnerabilities, but it also offers a 
survey of related works and research recommendations. Similar is the security 
guidance provided by the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) (CSA, 2011), which 
70 
 
defines security domains congregating specific functional aspects, from 
governance and compliance to virtualisation and identity management. Mutually, 
these documents present a plethora of security concerns, best practises, and 
recommendations regarding all types of services models and possible problems 
related to cloud computing, from data privacy to infrastructural configuration.  
Apart from the earlier mentioned references and top threat analysis—which 
highlights different security issues related to cloud computing that require further 
study to be appropriately addressed and, consequently, to enhance technology 
acceptance and adoption—there are several researchers and practitioners who 
have identified cloud threats, vulnerabilities, attacks, and other security and 
privacy issues. They have also provided countermeasures in the form of 
frameworks, strategies, recommendations, and Service-Oriented Architecture 
(SOA) (Khalil, Khreishah and Azeem, 2014; Veeramachaneni, 2015). 
Additionally, efforts in areas such as ad-hoc networks have been set to address 
the emerging security problems in the clouds and have addressed single 
attributes of cloud computing security such as data integrity, authentication 
vulnerabilities, and auditing (Khalil, Khreishah and Azeem, 2014; Subramanian 
and Jeyaraj, 2018).  
Other authors discuss cloud security issues involving data, applications, and 
virtualisation (Mell and Grance, 2011) and present surveys on cloud security 
requirements such as confidentiality, integrity, transparency, availability, 
accountability, and assurance (Duncan and Whittington, 2014). A survey on the 
different security issues of the service delivery models of the cloud has been 
presented, and the security challenges specific to the public clouds are discussed 
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by several researchers (Jansen and Grance, 2011; Shin, Kobara and Imai, 2012). 
Classification and validation of the security issues and requirements in the cloud 
based on the SPI (SaaS, PaaS, IaaS) cloud infrastructure and services model 
are also discussed (Zissis and Lekkas, 2012; Hashizume et al., 2013; 
Whaiduzzaman et al., 2014). Albeit how valuable in successfully addressing 
cloud security issues, these studies must further understanding of the multiple 
security challenges in a holistic way and how they affect a particular environment. 
Thus, the next section investigates cloud security in healthcare. 
4.3 Cloud Security in Healthcare 
According to the European Union (EU), eHealth refers to tools and services using 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) that can improve prevention, 
diagnosis, treatment, monitoring, and management of healthcare. This includes 
information and data sharing amongst patients and health service providers, 
hospitals, health professionals, and health information networks and of electronic 
health records; telemedicine services; portable patient-monitoring devices; 
operating-room scheduling software; robotised surgery (Kert, Markatos and 
Preneel, 2015). eHealth can benefit the entire community by improving access to 
care and quality of care and by making the health sector more efficient. ICT has 
been exploited in the healthcare sector for several decades. However, at present, 
there is the transition from the traditional model of a stand-alone health 
information systems (HIS), which is the HIS operating within the boundaries of a 
single healthcare organisation (HO), to the networked HIS that is an HO’s HIS 
interconnected to HISs of other HOs or even of third parties, over national or 
international wide area networks (WANs). Moreover, web-based eHealth 
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services are already being regularly provided, and the healthcare sector has 
started utilising the cloud computing paradigm. Additionally, mobile devices like 
laptops, PDAs, and even mobile phones are being increasingly used by the 
healthcare sector to access, store, or transmit health information within the 
framework of providing health services. The trend towards seamless system and 
data interconnection, mobile services, smart devices, and data analytics has 
already started and will likely lead to revolutionary changes in the delivery of 
healthcare.  
The security of health information and the privacy of the patients is a well- 
researched subject. A wealth of literature on this topic has been produced in the 
past decades. Issues that have been investigated for the present study pertain to 
the perceptions, attitudes, and concerns of healthcare service consumers 
regarding the privacy of health information subjects (Gaylin et al., 2011; Ancker 
et al., 2013). The perspectives of healthcare providers on the need for compliance 
to existing legal and regulatory requirements regarding the cybersecurity and 
privacy of health information, and technical and organisational methods for 
controlling access to online health information, have also been researched (Khan 
et al., 2014). Furthermore, literature relating to health information cybersecurity 
and privacy on web-enabled healthcare platforms and health information security 
and privacy in the cloud computing paradigm were reviewed (Khan et al., 2014; 
Das et al., 2018). Last was the review of implications of privacy and security on 
healthcare practise and health information security-risk management (Youssef 
and Youssef, 2014; Masud and Hossain, 2018). A range of relevant standards of 
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different standardisation organisations has complemented these extensive 
research results.  
However, despite the available technology, knowledge, and guidance, cloud 
security remains an issue in the healthcare sector. This is probably because, 
whilst most people recognise the need for securing healthcare cloud, what is 
often ignored is the fact that security provides technical solutions by creating 
physical and electronic barriers. The fundamental problems in computer security 
are no longer about technology but about applying that technology (Schneier, 
2000) to the healthcare sector. 
Despite the potential benefits of cloud computing in eHealth services, information 
security is still uncertain, and security problems have become more complex in 
the cloud models and require added effort to implement data management 
policies (Koo and Kim, 2015). The data stored in the cloud environment can be 
accessed or managed by more than one person (Rao and Selvamani, 2015), thus 
resulting in several major issues and concerns around data transmission and 
access control (Reddy, 2015). In addition, when users store and transfer their 
information on the cloud, the integrity of data and protection related to how to 
transfer healthcare data safely is an issue (Azhar et al., 2014).  
Another concern is that the storage of healthcare information in the cloud results 
in the patients losing physical control of their personal information. Transmission 
of data from one organisation to another is very delicate such that the patients 
must be vigilant in understanding the risks of data breaches in the new 
environment. To the best of the author’s knowledge, there is currently no existing 
nameless and secure data exchange solution in the healthcare cloud 
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environment (Rahman et al., 2016). Data stored in the cloud is often placed in a 
virtual environment, whose virtual server space could be shared with other 
customers of cloud service providers (CSPs). Healthcare organisations that 
transmit sensitive and regulated data into the cloud should ensure that the data 
is encrypted and secured.  
In addition to concern about shared computing resources within cloud 
infrastructures is identity and access management. Cloud technology increases 
functionality and accessibility and introduces additional needs in terms of 
information security, particularly authentication. Authentication using widely 
documented PINs is designed as a solution to overcome the vital issues that are 
usable and secure through biometric-based techniques to user identity 
(Saevanee et al., 2015). In the orthodox authentication method for access 
management, there might be an illicit use of data if the password is disclosed to 
an unauthorised person. Current identification and authentication methods in 
healthcare organisations may not be appropriate in cloud computing, and if these 
have a combination of single username/password for certain sensitive 
applications, they can present a weak link in the security structure.  
In the cloud, identity management helps to maintain security, identification, and 
control and emphasises identity and access control. In another regard, the use of 
the Internet in healthcare services delivery equally provides vital benefits to 
providers and patients. However, unauthorised access to healthcare data in 
virtual environments may result in abuse of data and regulatory noncompliance. 
Therefore, use of the cloud in healthcare has led to the use cybernetics 
management solutions for the secure transmission of data, providing solutions 
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across broadband networks and protecting devices from data breaches and 
unauthorised access (Gunamalai and Sivasubramanian, 2015).  
One of the most important changes in healthcare over the past two decades is 
the increasing investment in healthcare information security and confidentiality. 
Ensuring healthcare information security, privacy, and confidentiality is a 
continuous process and the serious responsibility of every healthcare 
organisation (Haufe, Dzombeta and Brandis, 2014). Cyberattacks and limited 
knowledge of authorised users are the main threats to healthcare systems. Cyber 
attackers use various means to breach confidentiality, integrity, and information 
accessibility, whilst users intentionally or through negligence can also be 
significant dangers to information security (Safa et al., 2015).  
For cyber attackers, the cloud platform produces more of a potential attack 
surface than a traditional data centre. Cyberattacks using malware infect 
healthcare systems’ components and spread throughout the environment. Thus, 
protecting the healthcare cloud from malware and other security threats requires 
identity management at network boundaries to ensure that only authorised users 
have access to the system. The same is true for securing server and client 
platforms to ensure data integrity. This feature is a necessity for healthcare cloud 
computing, and integrity here refers to the fact that unauthorised user has not 
accessed healthcare information in cloud.  
Hence, considering the extent of research already performed in the field, new 
research challenges primarily emerge because of the evolution of the healthcare 
system. At the same time, new computing paradigms and technological 
developments find their way into the healthcare sector. This implies that health 
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cloud security must be re-examined from a different perspective. The conditions 
under which new technological developments may be securely, effectively, and 
safely applied in the healthcare sector must be thoroughly investigated. Issues 
related to enabling secure eHealth services delivery and privacy-preserving 
information sharing over cloud platforms must be addressed and resolved. Lastly, 
a significant field of research is the preservation of security and privacy levels 
when interconnecting systems of varying degrees of maturity in the healthcare 
sector.  
It is clear that the security is one of the most important issues in hindering cloud 
computing acceptance. Other issues such as identity management and access 
control for virtual cloud environment, authentication and authorisation, and 
cyberattacks are also major concerns. Putting one’s data or running software on 
someone else's hard drive or using someone else's CPU may seem daunting to 
many, and most security challenges in cloud computing technology such as data 
mobility, multitenancy, and access control pose serious threats to sensitive 
information and software in healthcare organisations. Thus, all involved parties 
and their interactions in healthcare cloud computing should be defined and 
identified to ensure secure information exchange. Cloud service providers and 
healthcare organisations must establish clear processes for maintaining security 
in cloud environments. Protecting sensitive electronic medical data is one of the 
most essential responsibilities of healthcare organisations and one of the most 
tightly regulated areas in cloud. Thus, an essential procedure to improve security 
and deflect threats is through comprehensive understanding and the effective 
execution of dependent concerns and data protection (Mehraeen et al., 2016). 
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4.4 Cyber Security Standards, Best Practices, and Guidance   
Cyber security standards, guidance, and best practises have been in use, and 
their similarity is that they are reactive in nature. However, gaps exist between 
deciding whether something is needed and achieving implementation with such 
practises, which may span years. This becomes more of an issue for international 
standards due to the differing agendas of different countries, which can further 
increase the time to implementation. The problem is worse in a technological 
environment, such as security in computing, and especially in a fast-moving 
technology like cloud computing. However, not only is technology rapidly 
changing, but the threats to technology are also developing at a considerable 
pace (Cisco Annual Security Report, 2013).  
The standards outlined in this research were reviewed because they are the 
industry frameworks that encompass the recently updated NHS National Data 
Guardian’s (NDG) data security standards. The NDG data security standards are 
applied to every organisation handling health and social care information (NHS 
Digital, 2018). This research’s comprehensive scope leverages standards as a 
reference in the maturity assessment process to build the proposed novel 
maturity model. The standards provides views into compliance with the industry 
requirements. 
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 2700 series support 
healthcare organisations to drive real-life organisational improvement, as the 
standards are included in the healthcare organisation’s existing policies, 
processes, and procedures. The USA-based National Institute of Standards and 
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Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800 series, NIST Cyber Security 
Framework (CSF), and Cloud Security Alliance Cloud Controls Matrix (CSA 
CCM) are frameworks that can be used to support data security and protection 
assurance in healthcare. When it comes to compliance for healthcare IT, the 
compliance rule comes from Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) as a prescriptive guidance. Health Information Trust Alliance (HITRUST) 
provides the assessment to demonstrate the compliance to standards such as 
HIPAA and Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health 
(HITECH). It is relevant to mention that both NIST and HIPAA are United States 
specific. 
 International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) 
ISO 2700-series standards produced by the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 
provide best practises recommendations that cover the fundamental 
requirements of information security management systems as well as guidelines 
and principles for the implementation of such systems. The ISO 27001 (ISO/IEC 
27001:2013 Information technology–Security techniques–Information security 
management systems–Requirements, 2013) is valid for all organisations, 
regardless of their size and industries. It specifies the method that organisations 
should use for information security and the essential components thereof. It also 
ensures that identification and management of risks are properly verified. 
Compliance to such standard saves organisations from financial penalties and 
losses associated with data breaches; helps with meeting business, legal, 
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contractual, and regulatory requirements; and protects and enhances their 
credibility and reputations.  
ISO 17522 (ISO/TR 17522:2015, Health informatics–Provisions for health 
applications on mobile/smart devices, 2015) and ISO 27799 (ISO 27799:2016–
Health informatics–Information security management in health using ISO/IEC 
27002, 2016) standards are targeted towards health informatics. They provide 
guidelines for designing health-specific information management systems based 
on ISO 27002 and control patient safety within such systems, respectively. ISO 
27001 can be integrated with ISO 27799 standards to address healthcare-
specific risks. ISO 27017 (ISO/IEC 27017:2015–Information technology–Security 
techniques–Code of practise for information security controls based on ISO/IEC 
27002 for cloud services, 2015) provides detailed guidance and 
recommendations for cloud adoption. ISO 22857 addresses the protection 
requirements to facilitate cross-border transfer of personal healthcare data (ISO 
22857:2013–Health informatics–Guidelines on data protection to facilitate trans-
border flows of personal health data, 2013).  
Used together, these standards provide a complementary regimen for an 
organisation's cybersecurity readiness; however, navigating the many standards 
is complicated, has time and cost implications, and does not completely address 
some of the healthcare-specific concerns. Furthermore, some healthcare 
organisations have not been able to adapt the standards, guidelines, and best 
practises from the frameworks to their specific contexts and develop practises 
that meet their own needs. Other concerns include extensive time use and 
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expense of complying with different standards and the need for clarity and 
simplicity in implementation. 
 Health Information Trust Alliance Common Security Framework 
(HITRUST CSF) 
Healthcare industry leaders have provided a harmonised, certifiable framework 
for all organisations that create, access, store, or exchange sensitive and/or 
regulated health data using HITRUST. The HITRUST Common Security 
Framework (CSF) version 9 (HITRUST CSF version 9.1, 2018) is a 
comprehensive, risk-oriented framework that normalises the cybersecurity 
requirements of healthcare organisations. It is based on federal legislation such 
as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 164.502(ii) 
and globally recognised standards and guidance, including ISO 27799 using ISO 
27002, NIST SP 800-53 r4 AC-19 (NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4–
Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and 
Organizations, 2013). It provides scalable security requirements tailored to the 
needs of the healthcare organisations, allowing them to monitor and maintain 
compliance with HITRUST data security controls across their cloud infrastructure, 
including multi-cloud deployments.  
The HITRUST framework’s mapping with the NIST CSF reveals an industry-
specific model implementation, whilst the NIST framework provides broad 
guidance for critical infrastructure industries on organisational-level risk 
programmes that are holistic and used across industries. However, a major 
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constraint for the HITRUST framework is that it is yet to receive worldwide 
acceptance.  
 National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity 
Framework (NIST CSF) 
In addressing cybersecurity, many entities both within and outside of the 
healthcare sector have voluntarily relied on detailed cybersecurity guidance and 
specific standards issued by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST). NIST developed a set of guidelines on security and privacy in public cloud 
computing, SP 800-144 (Jansen and Grance, 2011). It provides an overview of 
the security and privacy challenges for public cloud computing and presents 
recommendations that organisations should consider when outsourcing data, 
applications, and infrastructure to a public cloud environment. NIST also 
developed a special publication, SP 800145 (Mell and Grance, 2011), for the 
definition of cloud computing, which has been globally accepted. The SP 500-
299 framework (NIST Cloud Computing Security Working Group, 2013) was 
developed to identify a core set of security components that can be implemented 
in cloud to secure the environment, operations, and data migrated to the cloud. It 
also released SP 500-291 Cloud Computing Standards Roadmap (Hogan et al., 
2011), SP 800-146 Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations (Badger 
et al., 2012), and SP 500-292 Cloud Computing Reference Architecture (Liu et 
al., 2011). SP 800-66 (Scholl et al., 2008) was developed for guidance in IT 
security planning, implementation, management, and operation. It includes 
publications that address many security areas that are impacted by the HIPAA 
cybersecurity rules. NIST 800-66 provides guidance on how to map HIPAA 
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controls with NIST 800-53. This is the only guideline that is specifically focussed 
on healthcare, although it does not mention cloud computing.  
In addition, to address the ever-increasing attacks on critical infrastructure, NIST 
also developed the cyber security framework (CSF) that provides a risk 
management model which various industries can leverage for improving the 
management of cybersecurity risk and achieving resilience; it was based on ISO 
27001, Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT) (A 
Business Framework for the Governance and Management of Enterprise IT, 
2012), and NIST 800-53. The framework is designed to complement 
organisational security processes and facilitate privacy risk management 
consistent with an organisation’s existing approach to cybersecurity. To ensure 
extensibility and enable technical innovation, the framework is technology neutral 
(NIST, 2017). This allows the relevant stakeholders to assess cybersecurity and 
identify gaps.  
However, the shortfall of the framework’s security controls was that they were 
specifically designed for US federal agencies and are not accepted worldwide. 
Initially, it was not sufficiently specific about cloud environments, but now major 
cloud service providers such as Amazon Web Services (Cotton et al., 2017) and 
Microsoft Azure (‘Mapping Microsoft Cyber Offerings to NIST Cyber security 
Framework Subcategories’, 2018) have taken steps to align their offerings to the 
framework, addressing the ambiguities about the use of the CSF in the cloud. 
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 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
The HIPAA was developed to ensure security and privacy of individually 
identifiable health information. HIPAA deals with security and privacy through its 
privacy rule (The Privacy Rule–HIPAA, 2015) and security rule (The Security 
Rule–HIPAA, 2017). The privacy rule ensures the flow of health information 
needed for quality care by addressing proper use and disclosure of health 
information. The security rule aims at protecting the privacy of individuals’ health 
information by adopting new technologies with a goal of achieving improved 
quality and efficiency of patient care. It operationalises the protection 
mechanisms contained in the privacy rule. HIPAA privacy and security rules are 
applied to healthcare providers and non-healthcare providers supporting 
healthcare providers holding or transmitting health information in electronic form. 
HIPAA compliance cannot be overlooked when it comes to cloud computing; 
however, it is no longer enough for a vendor to simply claim ‘HIPAA readiness’. 
Its controls are indicated as required, which makes implementation unclear. 
HIPAA is also not ‘certifiable’, resulting in the need for healthcare organisations 
to perform self-assessment for compliance.  
The scope of security and privacy protections available in HIPAA are extended 
through the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act 
(HITECH). In the healthcare industry, HITECH (HITECH Act Enforcement Interim 
Final Rule, 2017) provides legal liability for noncompliance to HIPAA and ensures 
the disclosure of breach and unauthorised use of electronic health records to 
necessary stakeholders.  
84 
 
 Cloud Security Alliance Standards Cloud Controls Matrix (CSA CCM) 
Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) and HITRUST developed security guidance for 
critical areas of focus in cloud computing, including various versions. Cloud 
Controls Matrix is a tool that maps security practises for the cloud with traditional 
security regulations and standards, such as Payment Card Industry (PCI), a 
MasterCard data security standard; HIPAA; and ISO 27000. Part of the mapping 
is achieved by leveraging the HITRUST Common Security Framework (CSF), a 
comprehensive security framework that provides prescriptive guidance and best 
practises and incorporates the existing security requirements of healthcare 
organisations, including federal (e.g., HIPAA and HITECH), third-party (e.g., 
Payment Card Industry (PCI) and COBIT), and governmental agencies (e.g., 
NIST). There are several versions: Version 1.0 (Security Guidance for Critical 
Areas of Focus in Cloud Computing, 2009), Version 2.1 (Security Guidance for 
Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud Computing V2.1, 2009), Version 3.0 (Security 
Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud Computing V3.0, 2011), and 
Version 4.0 (Mogull et al., 2017). The latest version focusses on meeting the 
demand of security changes. It also introduces better standards for organisations 
to manage cybersecurity in cloud by implementing security domains. The 
guidance can be applied to a cloud service models (Infrastructure-, Platform-, 
Software – as a Service) and four deployment models (public, private, 
community, and hybrid cloud) with derivative variations that address specific 
requirements. The guidance also included thirteen different domains, which are 
divided into two general categories: governance and operations. The governance 
domains focus on broad and strategic issues as well as policies within a cloud 
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computing environment, whilst the operations domains focus on more tactical 
security concerns and implementation within the cloud architecture.  
The Cloud Controls Matrix strengthens existing cloud information security by 
emphasising business information security control requirements, normalising 
cloud taxonomy, and encouraging consistent security measures. Regarding 
cloud security management, the guidance focusses on cloud-specific concerns: 
interoperability and portability, data security, and virtualisation. Dividing the 
implementation domains into two groups with strategic and tactical categories is 
another salient point provided by the guidance. This approach allows cloud 
consumers, providers to bring financial, and human resources into security 
consideration. Furthermore, the guidance can be mapped to existing security 
models, including the Cloud Control Matrix (Auditing the Cloud Controls Matrix, 
2013).  
Despite these benefits, the guidance lacks assessment standards for each 
domain. In addition, it does not consider metrics for security practises. Therefore, 
organisations find it difficult to determine the security level of a domain. 
 Summary of Reviewed Standards 
The NIST cybersecurity framework provides a set of activities to aid healthcare 
organisations in developing their individual maturity profiles. Although this 
framework is robust, it relies on operators to voluntarily develop individual profiles 
for their organisations. The ISO standards, whilst offering more specific advice, 
are complicated to implement and do not specifically address mutually supporting 
healthcare organisations. Overall, the review of the cybersecurity standards 
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(Section 4.4) shows that either they are complicated to implement or the 
organisation's processes may need to be refined during implementation. These 
standards and guidelines are strongly complied with by industries, but as 
assessed based on their applicability to the domains in Table 4.1 they fall short of 
explicit application to healthcare cloud.  
Next, there is a focus on mapping the reviewed standards to the standards’ 
application domains. In this context, application domains refer to the suitable 
applicability of the standards of using these domain titles as measures: 
‘healthcare cyber security’, ‘cyber security’, ‘healthcare cloud security’, ‘cloud 
security’, ‘healthcare usability’, and ‘health informatics’.  
Other characteristics to be included in the review are the relationships between 
the standards to reveal their interactions with other frameworks. It should be 
noted whether there is a framework to confirm compliance with the standard or, 
alternatively, whether or not it is common to have third-party audits certify 
compliance. 
To address healthcare cloud security-specific needs, standards are based on 
parameters such as scope, level of integration, industry applicability, 
prescriptiveness, scaling, tailoring, compliance, certification, shared assurance, 
assessment guidance, and tool support. With these aspects as a guide, the 





Standards Application domain Interaction with other 
frameworks 
Certification/audit 
ISO 2700 series Cloud security ISO 27001/2, 27799, 
27017 
Audits of compliance 




HITRUST CSF Health informatics HIPAA 164.502(ii), 
ISO 27799, NIST 
CSF 
Audits of compliance 




NIST CSF Cyber security, cloud 
security 
ISO 27001, HIPAA, 
COBIT 
Audits of compliance 




HIPAA/HITECH Health informatics HITECH The only way to prove 
compliance is through 
an external audit. 




Audits of compliance 




Table 4.1 Summary of reviewed standards 
4.5 Comparison of Maturity Models Applicable in Healthcare  
The comparison of maturity models applicable in healthcare identifies and 
compares existing cyber security/capability maturity models to provide a 
summary of the best practices. Based on the inclusion criteria, a search 
statement is formulated as defined in Section 4.1.1. To ensure all the maturity 
models compared are rooted in well-structured concept, exclusion criteria is 
developed as defined in Section 4.1.1.  
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The cybersecurity maturity models identified and reviewed are included because 
they outline different stages that show maturities in cyber security capabilities or 
processes. Secondly, the areas in which the models are used include healthcare 
or cyber/cloud security, capability maturity model in electronic healthcare, or a 
combination of both. The maturity models are compared to identify relevant 
theoretical structures and content. The comparison criteria include the 
dimensions (such as maturity levels and domains) in the maturity models are 
compared to identify relevant maturity structures. Lastly, the relevant content of 
the maturity models are identified. 
These cybersecurity maturity models were also chosen for this study because of 
their main design features. National Healthcare Service Infrastructure Maturity 
Model (NHS NIMM) is applicable to the healthcare organisational structure, 
culture, and working practises, aligning the strategic and tactical priorities of the 
organisation. It is also independent of technology and considers both technical 
and business capabilities of IT infrastructure. Health Information Network 
Capability Maturity Model (HIN CMM) can be used for intra-organisational and 
interorganisational benchmarks and assessment and organisational learning 
amongst healthcare institutions in a physical jurisdiction. The Information Security 
Focus Area Maturity Model (ISFAM) is easy to extend according to changes in 
an organisation’s IS needs and priorities. For the most part, these models are 
easy and intuitive to use and are written without excessive technical jargon. 
These models are considered the theoretical foundations for the development of 
the proposed maturity model M2HCS (discussed in Chapter Five).  
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 Information Security Focus Area Maturity Model  
The Information Security Focus Area Maturity (ISFAM) model is a focus area-
oriented maturity model, originally proposed as a method for incremental 
progression (Steenbergen et al., 2010). It consists of a fixed number of maturity 
levels; each process identified by a focus area/domain is assigned its own 
number of progressively more mature capabilities. It consists of four focus area 
groups, which cluster 13 focus areas and distribute 51 capabilities over 12 
maturity levels. The last can be grouped, in turn, for convenience into four 
maturity stages, which strongly resembles the audit control pattern (Singleton, 
2009). The overarching 12 levels result automatically from the capability 
interdependencies (Steenbergen et al., 2010).  
The model’s underlying assessment consists of a series of 161 yes/no questions. 
The assessment of the maturity level is executed through a survey or a directed 
interview with an expert. The ISFAM covers the complete domain of information 
security, combining the application of information security framework (ISO-light), 
ISO 2700-series, the Certified Information Systems Security Professional 
(CISSP) course, Standard of Good Practise of the Information Security Forum 
(ISF), and the International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) Security 
Framework (Spruit and Röling, 2014).  
As with all focus-area maturity matrices, the lowest implemented capability 
defines the maturity level reached. ISFAM was successfully evaluated using a 
medium-sized telecommunications organisation and a small or medium-sized 
enterprise (SME) in the healthcare sector. Despite that, it is extensive, relatively 
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fine-grained, and practical approaches are based on IBM’s experiences, the 
ISFAM model must redefine the capabilities’ improvement actions by making 
them less simplistic. It also does not mention being applicable to technologies 
such as cloud computing.  
 Cloud Security Capability Maturity Model 
The Cloud Security Capability Maturity Model (CSCMM) includes domains and 
maturity levels. There are twelve cloud security domains and four maturity levels. 
Each domain consists of a set of cybersecurity practises which are achievement 
objectives-specific for each cloud security domain. The maturity levels apply to 
each domain and specify progression of maturity. The model can be tailored for 
suitable objectives of different cloud service models (IPSaaS) and deployments 
(public, private, and hybrid cloud). Lastly, it provides the tool for organisations to 
implement and enhance their cybersecurity capabilities on the cloud system (Le 
and Hoang, 2017).  
There is not a complete cloud security standard because cloud technology is 
evolving much faster than standards are (Duncan and Whittington, 2014). 
Therefore, creating a set of cybersecurity domains just based on the current 
security standards does not fully consider emerging issues and attack surfaces. 
Cloud Security Capability Maturity Model (CSCMM) was built from a systematic 
review approach on existing cloud security models and standards, traditional 
security maturity models, and trends in emerging technologies. As a result, these 
twelve security domains—eight are from traditional maturity models, and four are 
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cloud specific—cover comprehensive aspects of cybersecurity and 
accommodate emerging security issues.  
To assess the maturity level of the model in general and a security domain in 
particular, a security metrics framework was proposed. This framework includes 
relevant quantitative metrics for measurable assessment. It presents a balance 
assessment of the overall security of an organisation, both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. For senior managers, it offers assessment of the security status 
for making decisions concerning business plans and direction. For security 
practitioners, it offers proactive measures and responsive actions. In addition, the 
CCSMM model has three dimensions—domain, level, and community (such as 
organisation, community, and state)—which makes the model more suitable for 
organisations of different sizes. However, this model is considered technically 
complex to implement in healthcare (Siponen and Willison, 2009; Stevanović, 
2011; Le and Hoang, 2016).  
  NHS National Infrastructure Maturity Model 
The National Infrastructure Maturity Model (NIMM), a maturity assessment 
framework designed by Connecting for Health (CfH), has provided useful 
guidance, national standards, best practises, and capability maturity tools for the 
NHS IT organisations to benchmark their local IT infrastructure 
services/capability and create a road map for improvements. It helps NHS IT 
organisations to carry out an objective self-assessment of the current IT 
infrastructure to assess their current 'point in time' maturity of specific 
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infrastructure capabilities and identify infrastructure maturity improvement 
projects.  
The NIMM framework is split into 13 categories across technical and business 
areas, 74 capabilities, 5 perspectives, and a number of key performance 
indicators. Its two main tools are the capability assessment documents, which 
contain key performance indicators (KPIs) for assessing each capability, resulting 
in a 'point in time' maturity score, and key capabilities self-assessment 
spreadsheet, which is a dashboard spreadsheet that records the scores from the 
capability assessments on a scale from 1 to 5, where 5 is the most mature; it also 
gives an overview of assessment progress (NHS, 2011a). 
Each category is further divided into a number of capabilities used to target the 
assessment to a specific area. A capability is then further organised into 
perspectives. Each perspective has a number of KPIs associated with it, against 
which the capability in question is assessed. Organising the metrics into 
perspectives provides the opportunity to review the capabilities 'in the round' and 
to develop an overall view of the capability rather than just from a technology 
viewpoint. 
The NHS Infrastructure Maturity Model (NIMM) provides a consistent framework 
for organisations to measure their own capabilities in specific areas and to 
subsequently identify and prioritise activity. Trusts/organisations create their own 
local assessments, aligned with NIMM, to support their local IT maturity 
assessment efforts. This approach ensures that Key Performance Indices (KPIs) 
and metrics reflect achievable maturity levels within the NHS. Not all capabilities 
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must be completed at once. Users can review the capability list, decide the 
priorities for their IT organisation, and concentrate their efforts on completing this 
subset.  
NHS IT organisations are to exercise the 12 NIMM core capability assessments 
first. Afterwards, a road map should be formulated to improve maturity. Then 
assessments that are more specific to the healthcare organisation should be 
selected and completed, and the outputs from these are incorporated into the 
formulated road map (Savvides, 2009). Most healthcare trusts are required to 
work towards level 3, increasing the maturity of their infrastructure and service 
provision and moving from manual configurations to managed systems with 
automation and proactive monitoring of services. The healthcare organisations 
generally recognise the fundamental part played by infrastructure in underpinning 
all information management and technology (IM&T) strategy, and so they have 
adopted the NIMM (NHS England, 2014).  
This model is still presently relevant in the cybersecurity maturity assessment of 
NHS IT organisations and is platform-independent; however, it does not consider 
the rapidly changing landscape of technology and security, such as cloud and its 
resulting threats.  
 Health Information Network Capability Maturity Model 
The Health Information Network (HIN) Capability Maturity Model is a tool that 
supports objective self-assessment and formulates plans to improve operational 
capabilities, level of service, and value delivered by HIN organisations. This fully 
vetted and accepted pan-Canadian model serves as a strategic and operational 
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planning tool. It provides a tool which HIN planners and operators can use to 
conduct a stepwise assessment such as ascertaining a jurisdiction’s HIN current 
capability maturity level, identifying a target maturity level appropriate to their 
needs, and developing a road map for moving toward that desired maturity level. 
It is based on other maturity models in healthcare and other industries, Canada 
Health Infoway’s strategic opportunities for action and key enablers, HIN 
Planning and Operations Leading Practices Discovery Framework, and 
observations and input from interviews with the leading practise organisations. 
This model was also developed to aid in continuous planning and assessment. 
The HIN Capability Maturity Model comprises ten capability domains and five 
maturity levels for each. It also includes an aggregate maturity across all 
domains, which can be used to broadly compare and communicate the overall 
maturity of the HIN. To apply this model, it must be refined with input from current 
jurisdictional HIE organisation operators, system planners, and policy makers, 
and tools for self-assessment, action planning, and progress monitoring are 
required to make it consistently and uniformly applicable (Giokas, Sekhon, 
Mestre, Geffen, Nouri, and Twoekowski, 2015). However, its shortcomings are in 
line with the NHS Infrastructure Maturity Model.  
 Summary and Analysis of Reviewed Maturity Models 
Cloud security maturity models show the level of completeness of cyber and 
cloud security capabilities. Their key features are maturity levels (also known as 
security measurement scale), security domains (known as the logical groups of 
practises and processes), attributes (or core contents of the model), assessment 
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metrics for measurement, and road maps to guide improvement efforts. Their 
main functions are to assess healthcare cybersecurity performance in cloud and 
guidance for improvement of processes and practises.  
The Cloud Security Maturity Model for healthcare is important because it provides 
a clear path to security in the cloud for healthcare organisations. Security threats 
in the cloud must be taken seriously; where there is no longer a defined perimeter 
and the attack surface is multiplied, attacks are more prevalent and pervasive. 
Considering the sensitivity of patients’ data handled in healthcare organisations, 
there is a need to be proactive, and the best way to do so is extending 
cybersecurity in the processes and practises to include workflow in the cloud.  
The twelve cybersecurity maturity models were reviewed to investigate their 
strengths and weaknesses. The similarities identified amongst these maturity 
models are that they are all multidimensional, including security domains and 
maturity levels. Most security domains vary from infrastructures, data, networks, 
humans, applications, and communications to compliance, legal, and contractual. 
Thus, to implement best security practises, standards such as National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Information Standards Organization 
(ISO) 27000 series are the baseline to measure security levels in all models.  
Most of the models have implementation process through four steps, from 
validation, and gap identification to priority and planning and plan implementation. 
Most of the models also implement a five-level framework to assess the security 
state of each domain. These five levels involve a three-stage process; the first 
stage is with no security management implementation. The following stage 
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focusses on the implementation of security standards to control security 
concerns. The third stage is an automatic security management with full security 
implementation; this is considered the innovative stage with highest security.  
The differences identified include that each model has domains with various 
security requirements based on the goals of the model, giving each one different 
advantages. None of these models mentioned extends its application to cloud 
computing environments and were industry-generic, not streamlined to 
healthcare environment. 
Information Security Focus Area Maturity Model (ISFAM) has successfully and 
conclusively been evaluated using a medium-sized telecommunications 
organisation. However, it does not mention being applicable to emerging 
technologies or cloud computing. Apart from the lack of validation of the real-life 
application of Capability Maturity Model and Metrics Framework for Cyber Cloud 
Security (CSCMM), its application to assess healthcare organisations would likely 
result in domain-specific challenges encountered when mapping the healthcare-
specific processes to the CSCMM process areas. This is due to its strong 
prescriptive properties and detailed appraisals of the processes with respect to 
the requirements of the maturity levels. Thus, the use of CSCMM with a 
compatible, domain-specific model is suggested.  
NIMM and Health Information Network Capability Maturity Model (HIN CMM) are 
nationally focussed maturity models. They are actively used and applicable within 
the United Kingdom and Canada, respectively. In addition, they are intended for 
determining the current capability of IT infrastructure within their local health 
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jurisdictions’ current capability and setting future priorities.  They are aim to 
enhance the overall IT management processes, access, quality, cost, and 
productivity of healthcare planning and delivery. However, NIMM is intended as 
a tool to identify its priority elements of IT infrastructure for assessment. While 
HIN CMM is intended as a tool for guiding stepwise assessment. 
Furthermore, NIMM can be used for self-assessment and uniform application, 
without the support of any other tools. HIN CMM requires tools for self-
assessment, action planning and progress monitoring to make it consistently and 
uniformly applicable. In addition, HIN CMM requires refinement with key 
stakeholders’ input for its active use and application. NIMM is used to certify ICT 
infrastructure providers, while the HIN CMM supports policies that support 
creation of HINs.  
Both models are presently relevant in the cybersecurity maturity assessment of 
healthcare organisations and are technology and vendor independent. NIMM 
focusses on NHS needs, whilst HIN emphasises jurisdiction’s needs. However, 
neither considers the rapidly changing landscape of technology, such as 
characteristics of cloud computing and its resulting security threats. 
Maturity Models Dimensions Assessment Metrics 
ISFAM 12 maturity levels, 13 
domains, 64 capabilities 
A survey or directed interview 
CSCMM 12 domains, 4 maturity levels A security metrics framework 
NHS NIMM 13 categories, 5 maturity 
levels, 74 capabilities 
Balanced scorecards, 
dashboard 
HIN CMM 10 domains, 5 maturity levels Input from policy makers 
Table 4.2 Summary of reviewed maturity models 
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4.6 Identified Research Gaps and Operational Characteristics of Proposed 
Model   
Apart from the lack of a security maturity model streamlined for eHealth cloud, 
the other identified gaps in the review of these maturity models occur in the 
aspect of adoption; the maturity models are either too complicated to implement, 
or they require the healthcare organisation’s processes to be refined to suit their 
implementation. The review of these models results in the question: How can the 
adoption of the proposed model, Maturity Model for Healthcare Cloud Security 
(M2HCS), be increased effectively in the eHealth cloud environment? 
The five factors of diffusion of innovation theory that impact adoption are the value 
the innovation provides over the current method, how easy it is for the innovation 
to be incorporated into healthcare organisational workflow, how easy to use the 
innovation is, how easy it is to try the innovation without commitment, and how 
visible the innovation is in the community of the adopter’s peers (Sanson‐Fisher, 
2014).  
In relation to this theory, the novel maturity model M2HCS seeks to achieve these 
operational characteristics (OC):  
 The M2HCS can support in the assessment of security practises in the 
eHealth cloud (OC1). 




 The descriptions of the objectives are clear and relate to the maturity levels 
(OC3). 
 M2HCS supports the assessment of the maturity of each of the specified 
domains to identify weak and strong practises (OC4). 
 M2HCS can aggregate results from the individual domains to a suitable 
output that can be understood by all stakeholders (OC5). 
 Further steps towards improving the maturity level are recommended 
(OC6). Recommendations must be prioritised for improving the maturity 
based on available organisational resources (OC7). 
M2HCS seeks to be a novel maturity model that satisfies these operational 
characteristics and assesses the security practises of a healthcare organisation 
using eHealth cloud. It also incorporates ‘usability and functionality’ objectives 
into its assessment of security practises. The fundamental reason for this addition 
to the proposed maturity model of M2HCS was that poor usability often equals 
poor security (Sheng et al., 2006). Whilst much of the healthcare industry’s 
discussion about usability seems to place emphasis on patients, in the proposed 
model, the focus is on gaining a better understanding of the needs, goals, and 
frustrations of stakeholders like physicians and other nonclinical staff. The 
inspirational frameworks for the usability and functionality objectives are the ISO 
9241-11 (Bevan and Nigel, 2006; Bevan, 2009; Bevan, Carter and Harker, 2015) 
and Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society (HIMSS) Usability 
Maturity Model (Staggers et al., 2011). 
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There are several approaches to perform healthcare workflows when using 
entirely different security mechanisms, and some are more secure than others. 
Practitioners select the more secure approach if it is easy to follow and allows 
them to complete their tasks quickly. However, if the more secure way is 
challenging, time-consuming, or stops them completing their tasks, then 
practitioners will expectedly find their own approach to get their tasks completed, 
but they may not use the more secure approach (Adams and Sasse, 1999). 
Scenarios like this depict how 'people often represent the weakest link in cyber 
security chain and are chronically responsible for the failure of security systems' 
(Schneier, 2000). However, if the appropriate security approaches for completing 
tasks or clinical workflows means that healthcare efficiency is reduced, medical 
practitioners seek to pursue other means. 
The proposed model, Maturity Model for Healthcare Cloud Security (M2HCS), 
aims to assess the ‘usability and functionality’ objectives by focussing on 
transferring the effort of making security decisions away from end users (medical 
practitioners) and to the back end (server-side). Secondly, it aims to significantly 
improve security mechanisms by making them more usable, meaning security 
processes do not inhibit their clinical workflow. Thirdly, practitioners should be 
able to locate the right security advice and information when they need it, at the 
right times, supported by the right skills, tools, habits, and motivation. Overall, this 
model enhances the integration of security practises (some of which are taken 




Usability is of great importance in healthcare because the effectiveness and 
efficiency of healthcare service delivery impact people’s lives. The care and 
upkeep of patients’ health are subject to effective healthcare efficiently delivered 
by practitioners. A more usable healthcare cloud improves patient safety, makes 
practitioners more content with their capability to provide care, and saves money.  
4.7 Chapter Conclusion  
This chapter reviews cybersecurity standards, best practises and guidance, and 
models including cloud security models and cybersecurity capability maturity 
models, mostly applicable within the healthcare environment. However, three 
specific issues must be addressed by the proposed model:  
 The influencing factors of cybersecurity on a security maturity model 
should be more than standards compliance.  
 It must integrate identified relevant factors into the maturity levels and 
determine appropriate metrics for security assessment.  
 The model should be malleable for ensuring current cybersecurity and 
extensible for dealing with security against emerging cyber threats.  
The main insight obtained from the review is the present inadequacy of 
cybersecurity maturity models to effectively assess security in healthcare 
organisations which are actively using cloud computing. The reviewed existing 
maturity models do not focus on security for eHealth cloud services, which forms 
the purpose for the model proposed in this research. 
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By identifying interactions between the several domains of healthcare information 
security and signifying them cogently in the proposal of a Maturity Model for 
Healthcare Cloud Security (M2HCS), the aim is to mitigate reactive assessment 
of security in a healthcare cloud environment and support incremental operations 
to improve information security maturity within healthcare organisations. The 
following chapter discusses in more detail the design and development of the 




5 Maturity Model Development  
This chapter discusses the development process of the maturity model and the 
results of the survey feedback. It starts with a summary of the relevant theoretical 
background, and then the development strategy and approach are elaborated 
upon; finally, the results of the maturity levels and maturity dimensions are 
presented, leading to the maturity model, M2HCS. The methodology chosen was 
Design Science Research Methodology (DSRM). 
5.1 M2HCS Development Methodology 
A relative study was performed on the procedural methods used in the 
development of information system maturity models found in the literature 
(Becker et al. 2009, Bruin et al. 2005, Mettler and Rohner 2009). The foremost 
method used is DSRM (Hevner et al., 2004; Elmaallam and Kriouile, 2013). In 
this research, it is essential to reflect the iterative stages which are, to clearly 
describe the structure of the maturity model, and validate the maturity model’s 
capacity to solve the problem addressed (March and Smith, 1995). Hence, a 
robust and documented research method, such as DSRM, is vital for the 
development of Maturity Model for Healthcare Cloud Security (M2HCS).  
DSRM presents the decision parameter elements (Figure 5.1). This method 
consists of five steps. Within each step, several decisions must be made before 












Figure 5.1 Mettler Methodology Decision Parameters (Carvalho et al., 2017) 
 Recognise Need  
This is the first step, and two main parameters to deliberate on are the 
novelty and the innovation of the maturity model since this decides the 
need for this model. The novelty parameter assesses the security of 
healthcare organisations actively using cloud computing. This model 
considers the domain, controls, maturity levels, and assessment proven 
by theoretical conventions. Innovation is the second parameter considered 
for the development of M2HCS, which is a completely new model, not a 
variant or version of an existing one. 






 Define Scope 
For the scope of this model, it must be determined if it focusses on a broad 
or specific area. Though a key feature of M2HCS is its inclusive nature, 
this model is applied solely to hospital organisations actively using cloud 
computing; for this cause, the research focusses on a specific 
area. Following this, the conditions and details must be reflected. Thus, 
M2HCS includes features related to the internal processes of healthcare 
organisations and the practises of their service providers. In accordance 
with the constituent directives of DSRM (Hevner et al., 2004), the potential 
audience of the model should also be decided. For M2HCS, the choice of 
the audience parameter is the ‘both’ option to include the managers of the 
healthcare organisations who have the authority to make decisions (such 
as executives) and department directors (CIOs or IT directors).  
 Model Design 
In this step, the model is constructed. This begins with the definition of the 
maturity concept of the proposed model. There are three different 
concepts of maturity (Mettler and Rohner, 2009), depending on whether 
its focus is on the process, the object, or the people. M2HCS uses the 
‘combination’ approach to measure maturity as this increases the 
competence of healthcare cloud security (process oriented) and the 
approval of practitioners who use it (people oriented). In addition, M2HCS 
assesses the different controls concerning organisational and technical 
capacities. Whilst defining the maturity of the model, how maturity will 
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progress is also implicitly defined. Competence is often the fundamental 
objective of the processes and approval of practitioners a fundamental 
objective of the end users.  
A maturity model can have multiple elements, as is the case with 
M2HCS. Therefore, it is important to decide if the advancement of maturity 
will be one-dimensional (only focussing on an aspect of security) or 
multidimensional (aiming at several aspects of security) (De Bruin et al., 
2005). The multidimensional maturity advancement of M2HCS is reflected 
by the aspects measured for maturity, encompassing comprehensive 
controls that measure the overall maturity of the healthcare cloud security 
and also the maturity of each domain of controls. Subsequently, M2HCS 
adopts the theory-driven knowledge base to develop maturity levels and 
take on a healthcare domain-specific metric. Furthermore, the format of 
the model is manual and specialised as an assessment tool of maturity for 
healthcare cloud security, and included is the textual description of its 
application. The choice of application means that data collection is based 
on self-assessment. Primarily, the managers of the healthcare 
departments, whose maturity is to be assessed, are the ones who must 
apply M2HCS since they know the reality of their organisation. Whilst the 
data collection process is fundamentally performed by the managers, it 





 Assess Design 
This step is concerned with the validation of M2HCS. Validation, in this 
case, is the degree to which a maturity model is a precise demonstration 
of the real world from the viewpoint of the intended users of the model 
(Conwell, Rosemary and Marcia, 2000). Therefore, it is vital to define an 
approach to test the model after the development but prior to 
implementation. M2HCS has been validated in terms of form and content, 
using a case study and expert survey. This was based on extracting the 
experience and reflection of end users of the model. Care was taken to 
ensure that the ten experts have significant experience in security maturity 
assessment in a healthcare environment.  
 Assess Evolution 
In this last step, the tendency of M2HCS to change over time was 
decided. This refers to the modification of the requirements to reach a 
certain level of maturity due to the innovation of new and better practises 
and technologies. Changes in the form and function of the model may be 
required to ensure its standardisation and global acceptance. (In this 
research, this step was not performed due to time constraints.) In Error! R











Novelty Emerging Pacing Disruptive Mature 
Innovation New Variant Version  
2. Define 
Scope 
Breadth Generic issue Specific issue 
Depth Individual/group Organisation Inter-
organization 
Global 





Process Object People Combination 
Goal function Single dimensional Multidimensional 
Design 
process 













Third party Experts   





Process Product Both  
Point of time Ex ante Ex post Both  
Validation 
method 
Natural Artificial Both  
Table 5.1 Decisions taken for the design of M2HCS (Mettler and Rohner, 2009)
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M2HCS Development Process  
The review of the relevant maturity models resulted in the identification of 
important domains and controls within Maturity Model for Healthcare Cloud 
Security (M2HCS). An overview of these identifications is presented below. A 
group of activities based on established research methodologies and considered 
most suitable for M2HCS was defined (Figure 5.2). The review of key concepts 
on healthcare cyber and cloud security maturity models was followed by the 
identification of domains, controls within the domains, levels, and validation of 
M2HCS. Based on the questionnaire survey of six field-related experts, M2HCS 
was validated. The chosen methodology, DSRM, supported these activities. 
 
Figure 5.2 Activities for the development of M2HCS 
5.2 M2HCS Maturity Model 
M2HCS combines its foundational models’ capabilities to produce a more holistic 
model that can be used to develop a healthcare organisation’s security practises 
against cyber and cloud security attacks. Its novel contribution lies in supporting 
healthcare organisations with developing the maturity of their security practises 
against emerging cyber and cloud security attacks.  
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Furthermore, it aims to assess the usability and functionality of the implemented 
security practises within each domain and the workflow of the healthcare 
organisation. The model is conceptualised at a high level, focussing on the 
characterisation of the maturity goals of cybersecurity for the healthcare 
organisation using third-party or their own cloud services. It bridges the gaps 
between the levels of governance and operation for healthcare at the maturity, 
usability, and functionality levels of their cloud cybersecurity capabilities. The 
model allows the assessment of present cybersecurity abilities and defines the 
main actions each healthcare organisation must perform to progress to the 
optimisation stage. 
 M2HCS Maturity Domains 
Five security domains with frequent recurrence (incident response management 
[IRM], identity and access management [IAM], enterprise risk management 
[ERM], personnel security [PeS], and physical security [PhS]) were identified in 
the reviewed models (Figure 5.3). Each domain is a group of related cybersecurity 
activities that also focusses on aspects of cloud characteristics. The controls 
within each domain are the defined maturity goals specific for cloud cybersecurity. 
The domains are based on the categories of cybersecurity capability from the 
reviewed models. These five cybersecurity domains address comprehensive 




Figure 5.3 Influences of Foundational Models and Development of Maturity 
Domains 
The IAM (Identity & Access Management) domain of the research model was 
mainly influenced by the HIN CMM (Health Information Network Capability 
Maturity Model), NHS NIMM (NHS Infrastructure Maturity Model), and ISFAM 
(Information Security Focus Area Maturity Model). Its objective—authorization 
and access control—was further influenced by the CSCMM. The IRM (Incident & 
Response Management) domain was mainly influenced by the NHS NIMM and 
ISFAM. Its objective—incident response and containment—was influenced by 
the CSCMM (Capability Maturity Model and Metrics Framework for Cyber Cloud 
Security) (Le and Hoang, 2017). The third domain, ERM (Enterprise Risk 
Management), was mainly influenced by the ISFAM (Spruit and Röling, 2014). Its 
objective—information assurance—was influenced by the HIN CMM (Giokas, 
Sekhon, Mestre, Geffen, Nouri and Twoekowski, 2015). The PeS (Personnel 
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Security) and PhS (Physical Security) domains were mainly influenced by the 
NHS NIMM (Savvides, 2009; NHS, 2011a).  
Furthermore, the Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society’s 
(HIMSS) cloud computing security in healthcare toolkit (HIMSS, 2017) supports 
the objectives of identity management and federation, business continuity and 
resiliency, incident response, and infrastructure security. The Cloud Security 
Alliance Cloud Control Matrix (CSA, 2017) also supports business continuity 
management, data centre security, governance and risk management, human 
resources, identity and access management, and incident management. Not 
included in Figure 5.3 is the objective of usability and functionality in each domain, 
which was mainly influenced by the HIMSS usability maturity model (Staggers et 
al., 2011). 
However, NHS Infrastructure Maturity Model is the main influence on Maturity 
Model for Healthcare Cloud Security as four domains were impacted by it (Figure 
5.3). Since NIMM is a capability maturity model specific to UK healthcare 
organisations, it considers the processes implemented within the healthcare 
sector, thereby supporting the capability of M2HCS within the same sector. 
M2HCS combines ISFAM and CSCMM models that cover the holistic categories 
of cyber and cloud security domains, and it is streamlined to enhance the 
healthcare capability processes of the HIN capability maturity model and NIMM.  
The proposed M2HCS model has two dimensions: maturity domains and maturity 
levels (Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2). The first dimension offers five cloud security 
domains. The maturity model also includes 20 objectives corresponding to each 
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domain (Section 5.2). Healthcare organisations can use these maturity levels to 
define their present maturity levels, decide their subsequent practicable maturity 
level, and detect the elements that must be satisfied to reach the next maturity 
level. The domains are:  
 Identity and Access Management (IAM): This guarantees verification, 
approval, and management of identities. The core focusses on identity 
verification—permitting an apt level of access—and policy administrations. 
This domain seeks to inhibit unapproved admission to physical and virtual 
resources.  
 Incident and Response Management (IRM): This focusses on incident 
identification, response, and management. Its major concerns include 
creating and conserving strategies, measures, and tools to identify, 
evaluate, and respond to cloud security incidents.  
 Enterprise Risk Management (ERM): This is another significant aspect of 
information security. A business may not always be secure, but it is 
capable of managing its risks. It is concerned about detecting potential 
breaches, preventing, and managing them: indemnification, mitigation, 
and retention. 
 Personnel Management (PeS): This emphasises human resource 
processes: pre-employment and employment through to termination. This 
ensures that the effective policies and procedures are in place to address 
security issues. It also supports an ethos of security and the constant 
suitability and attitude of all personnel.  
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 Physical Security (PhS): This encompasses the devices and facilities of 
the cloud service provider and customer. The organisation must obtain a 
guarantee from the provider that suitable security controls are in position. 
It safeguards against environmental or other possible intimidations that 
could interrupt cloud services, devices, security controls, and backup 
utilities.  
Interoperability and portability, virtualisation, and isolation could be added to 
create new domains, but these were not used in the proposed model. This is 
because there have been more recent attacks on the virtualisation layer, and 
isolation techniques have materialised as a new tactic for safeguarding cloud 
(Sonehara, Echizen and Wohlgemuth, 2011).  
Maturity Levels Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Maturity Domains Objectives 
Incident Response 
Management (IRM) 
Firewall configurations, data governance (IRM.1), disaster 
recovery, incident reporting and response (IRM.2), usability and 
functionality 
Identity and Access 
Management (IAM) 
Authorisation and access control (IAM.2), mobile device 
management, Identity federation and provisioning (IAM.1), account 
lockout procedures, usability and functionality 
Enterprise Risk 
Management (ERM) 
Threat and vulnerability awareness, risk identification, risk control 
and monitoring (ERM.1), risk assessment and response (ERM.2), 
usability and functionality 
Personnel Security 
(PeS) 
Employee training (PeS.1), external personnel security, 
organisational culture (PeS.2), usability and functionality 
Physical Security 
(PhS) 
Connected medical device (PhS.1), cloud storage security (PhS.2), 
usability and functionality 
Table 5.2 Dimensions of M2HCS 
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 M2HCS Maturity Levels 
This overall framework is proposed as a tool to assess the capability of healthcare 
organisations to achieve cloud security and business missions. It seeks to define 
a progression that manages, measures, and controls all aspects of eHealth cloud 
security. To do so, it depends on five core indicators (IRM, IAM, ERM, PeS, PhS) 
for referencing and recognising security needs in a healthcare organisation.  
It is very important for cybersecurity practitioners and executive decision makers 
to know their return on investment in security. It is even more essential to assess 
how suitable these investments are to safeguard their healthcare organisations 
as security policies, regulations, and threat settings are regularly changing (Beres 
et al., 2009). These are the well-known vulnerabilities an organisation can 
experience.  
The first stage of vulnerability is ‘hardened’,    when the basic required security-
related mechanisms, including patches, have been implemented. The next state 
is termed ‘vulnerable’, and it ensues when a minimum of one security update has 
not been implemented. The ‘compromised’ state occurs when the system has 
been successfully exploited (McHugh, Fithen and Arbaugh, 2000). For these 
vulnerability statuses, benchmarks are required to specify the organisation’s 
security posture so that the period of susceptibility can be reduced by using a 
standard process to eradicate the susceptibility and its related threats. The 
degree of threats can be reduced if organisations are aware of their security 
posture. Therefore, the proposed model considers four levels of compliance. 
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eHealth cloud security is assumed to progress as the healthcare organisation 
moves up these four levels ( 
 
Figure 5.4). A detailed description of the model in tabular form is attached in 
Appendix B. 
The maturity levels of M2HCS are built upon the generic level indicators of the 
foundational maturity models. This is done because these maturity models make 
use of maturity levels that are either identical to or strongly resemble the 
capability maturity model (CMM), which is suggestive of the generic usefulness 
and validity of these levels. However, the maturity levels in the proposed model 
underwent minor changes (Error! Reference source not found.).  
The maturity levels of M2HCS are defined from this viewpoint: A level zero (0), 
‘undefined’, is contained within the model, similar to some CMMs. Level zero (0) 
contains objectives that imply that no capability whatsoever exists. Although level 
zero (0) objectives are included, the level itself is not included as a maturity level. 
In this way, the CMM practise is followed. 
CMM ISFAM CSCMM NHS NIMM HIN CMM M2HCS 
  0 
(Undefined) 
   































4 (Monitoring)  5 (Innovative) 5 (Optimize) 4 
(Resilient) 
Table 5.3 Influences of Foundational Maturity Models and Development of Maturity Levels 
M2HCS consists of four maturity levels, progressing from reactive, to compliant, 
proactive, and resilient (Error! Reference source not found.). The maturity l
evels specify advancement of maturity. Hence, they apply to each domain.  
Maturity 
Levels 
Level Description Summary of Domain Practises 
1 Reactive Controls are operated reactively 
2 Compliant Solely standards-compliant 
3 Proactive Implemented, structured practises 
4 Resilient Real-time security practises 
Table 5.4 Summary of M2HCS Maturity Levels and Practises 
A healthcare organisation may proceed through these maturity levels to achieve 
a highly secure cloud-based healthcare system. It is expected that as the maturity 
level rises, the model presents some processes and descriptions to aid in the 
progress.  
Each maturity level has a predefined set of characteristics: 
Level One, Reactive 
This level is the starting point for the healthcare organisations actively using 
cloud. It is characterised by the organisation having elementary practical 
implementation in security systems, which is considered disordered, unreliable, 
and ad hoc, and it reactively responds to attacks, probably due to loss of 
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resources from the attacks. Such healthcare organisations have no defined 
policies or procedures to protect them. Their primary focusses are on the 
professional activities of the organization, and there is limited consideration for 
securing the organisation.  
Level Two, Compliant 
At this level, the healthcare organisation begins to guarantee that its security 
mechanisms provide stability. A healthcare organisation creates awareness of 
fundamental risk assessments, key applications, and network security, but its 
applications are mainly ad hoc. The focus is on the protection of essential 
systems, resulting in the perception that their systems are protected. The 
organisation has labour-intensive and reactive procedures to govern security 
incidents, but it is mainly in the stage of implementing cybersecurity processes. 
Level Three, Proactive 
At this level, there is central supervision of cloud security-related issues and 
policies related to the healthcare organisation. A healthcare organisation at this 
level has implemented enterprise-wide risk practises in the cloud and structured 
practises for information security risks. It is accountable for these responsibilities, 
and security policies and procedures are implemented with suitable mechanisms 
to support awareness and compliance. Access controls are binding and are 
thoroughly supervised to ensure strengthened social credential. Security 
processes are introduced, with the owner’s responsibility stated. Such 
organisations have programmed mechanisms to govern the source and range of 
incidents. They are mainly in the stage of implementation and automation of 
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cybersecurity processes. The focus is on the professional activities, end users, 
and monitoring of security threats and all related mechanisms are tested and 
promptly implemented. They are mindful of their security needs, and they invest 
in systems that protect the organisation.  
Level Four, Resilient 
This level implies that an organisation is in control of its security needs. Such an 
organisation has real-time monitoring of risks and threats and uses risks 
assessment as a driver for security investment. At this level, there are proper 
policies and procedures implemented to prevent, detect, and correct eHealth 
cloud security-related issues. These are managed by identifying, reporting, and 
resolving security incidents, which ensures they are traced in an efficient way. 
The use of standard technologies throughout the healthcare organisation is a 
constant routine. Security of facilities ensures asset resilience and priority on 
physical security as well as cloud security. Resilient organisations are at the stage 























































Connected Medical Device, Physical Cloud Storage, Employee Awareness, External Personnel, Hospital 
Culture, Risk Identification, Risk Control and Monitoring, Risk Assessment and Response, Access 
Control, Lock out procedures, Mobile Device Management, Identity Federation and Provisioning, 
Firewall policies, Data Governance, Disaster Recovery, Incident Response and Handling Mechanism, 
Incident Reporting, Patch Management, Usability and Functionality 




Figure 5.4 Detailed Dimensions of M2HCS 
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5.3 Metrics  
Metrics are measurement criteria that support decision making by assessing 
relevant data. A metric differs from a measurement, which calculates a single 
aspect of the object to be measured, whilst the metric is a result of two or more 
measurements to validate an essential association that can support decision 
making. Metrics are commonly multidimensional. They have lateral 
(administrative functions) and hierarchical (administrative levels) characteristics. 
To meet their projections, information system (IS) metrics should have these 
model features (Barabanov, Kowalski and Yngström, 2012).  
 Metrics must measure and express meaningful information (in content and 
presentation) in the proposed setting and to the target audience.  
 Metrics used should be easy to obtain; this ensures any flaws in data 
collection do not take all the resources required for successive steps of 
measurement. 
 Metrics should track targeted changes over an appropriate period.  
 Metrics must give specific and reliable numeric values using clear 
elements of measure.  
 Metrics must be constantly reproduced by different assessors under 
related settings; therefore, the measures must be well defined.  
 M2HCS Metric 
A design standard in existing maturity models is to demonstrate maturity as a 
number of levels, where the necessities of lower levels are accomplished to 
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progress to higher levels. Here, the principle is, in effect, ‘what cannot be 
measured cannot be effectively managed’. A well-known example is the 
capability maturity model, founded on a strict design and stating a number of 
goals and/or key practises to achieve a predetermined level of complexity. 
However, the number of levels may differ based on the focus of the study; in the 
case of this research model, there are four levels.  
Moreover, five domains have been developed to assess and manage the 
healthcare organisation’s compliance with M2HCS. Each domain has its own core 
indicators, and these ten indicators are domain specific. They assess the security 
practises and the overall performance of the eHealth cloud. The assessment 
activities are intended as a guide to draw the assessors’ attention to good 
practises and assist in evaluating the practises for their eHealth cloud.  
For each control in a domain, a concise summary of practises mapped to the 
model’s processes were described. The responses called for determine the level 
of operations in the healthcare organisation; however, some controls may not be 
applicable to the eHealth cloud and should, therefore, be ignored.  
The level of operations is measured by allocating a four-point rating scale (based 
on maturity levels) to calculate how well the practises are performed. The 
domains require combined ratings of their predetermined activities to develop a 
comprehensive rating. An overall rating of all domains is made from an average 
of the domains, and this reveals the compliance with the proposed maturity 
model. The maturity level is then calculated using the M2HCS metrics flow chart, 
as shown in Error! Reference source not found.Error! Reference source not fo
und.. Maturity levels are assigned depending on the description of the 
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cybersecurity metrics. Afterwards, a maturity report is generated that describes 
all steps of the metrics and reveals the ultimate impact and consequences to the 
healthcare organisation.  
 Decision Process for Assigning Maturity Level 
The stages of the decision process are presented in the metrics flowchart 
depicted in Error! Reference source not found. Figure 5.5 and explained below.  
Stage 1: The assessors obtain the healthcare organisation’s business goals, 
including its related cybersecurity risks. Afterwards, tangible, written records and 
further spoken information are collected about the healthcare organisation’s 
existing cybersecurity policies and activities. In this stage, the five domains and 
the four maturity levels used to assess these domains, and the electronic 
healthcare cloud security, are well defined.  
Stage 2: The metric components and measuring methods are identified, along 
with the objectives for all domains. In this stage, the sub-dimensions (objectives) 
that are used to assess the domains for cloud security in the healthcare 
organisation are defined. Amongst the various objectives to be defined, the 
numbered ones in Figure 5.5 which are described as the core objectives, must 
be achieved in each domain. 
Stage 3: Elements identified are surveyed and measured. To measure the 
electronic healthcare cloud security in the healthcare organisation, the 
objectives/control activities are measured and assessed based on the multiple 
statements of activities obtained from the healthcare organization.  
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Stage 4: Using the information collected in the second and third steps, each 
objective/control activity of electronic healthcare cloud security in the healthcare 
organisation is measured. Afterwards, a rating is created for the maturity level of 
each objectives/control activity and is assigned based on the organisation’s 
particular statement(s) of activities.  
 Stage 5: The maturity level for each domain is calculated. Next, by calculating 
all the objectives/control activities of the domains, the maturity level for each 
domain is calculated based on the average of all the maturity rates for all 
objectives/control activities. Afterwards, the overall maturity level is calculated for 
all the domains in the proposed maturity model, M2HCS. The overall maturity 
level is the average of the maturity of all the domains. To calculate the overall 
maturity level using M2HCS, the formula in Equation 1is used. 
Stage 6: This stage checks for additional information obtained. If there is none, 
the process proceeds to the next step; otherwise, it returns to Stage 4. 
Stage 7: A list of security practises to support the maturity progression of 
electronic cloud security in the healthcare organisation is proposed using the 
steps in section 5.3.2.  
Stage 8: The progressive practises are put in place for implementation to produce 



























Figure 5.5 M2HCS Metrics Framework 
Measurement/Mapping collected 




Metrics plan: identify metrics 
component, measuring 
method, collect data 
Inputs: Organizational 
goals, Tangible evidence 
of security practices & 
policies 




Maturity Level 4 
Propose progressive actions using the 
ratings 




Prioritize progressive actions based on 
Organizational resources 







 How to Measure  
Compliance to the model’s features, listed previously, is usually necessary. 
However, in practise, many organisations may fail in their ability to do so (Jansen, 
2009). The two most crucial concerns are as follow:  
 Qualitative IS measures are still the standard in most organisations which 
are not completely competent, resulting in decisions often based on 
individual information. 
 Quantitative IS measures are assessed without displaying connection with 
other elements, making their results not entirely beneficial for decision 
making (Axelrod, 2008).  
It is important to understand which diverse measures can and cannot be used to 
specify required results (Herrmann, 2007; Jaquith, 2007; Axelrod, 2008). For 
instance, there is a major drawback in the use of the statistical forms of metrics 
in M2HCS. For example, calculating an average of the performance of a number 
of domains and controls may deliver a comprehensible and revealing measure of 
the overall security posture of healthcare organisation. However, it also conceals 
the fact that some domains and controls may be performing below the anticipated 
aim, whilst the average may be above it (Jaquith, 2007; Payne, 2007).  
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With reference to Stage 5, the final maturity level is calculated by this formula: 
  
Equation 1 M2HCS Formula 
where 𝛽 denotes final maturity level, ∑ denotes summation of domain levels, 𝑑 
denotes domain, 𝐿 denotes level for each domain, and n denotes number of 
domains. 
 Assessment Using Adopted Healthcare Domain-Specific Metrics 
Most of the existing cybersecurity assessment practises emphasise assessing 
cybersecurity programme efficiency (E Chew et al., 2008) or measuring specific 
IS components like networks (Jansen and Grance, 2011). After making the choice 
of appropriate security metrics, a security metrics suite must be developed to 
deliver the healthcare organisation a means to achieve, manage, or develop the 
cybersecurity domains (Schimkowitsch, 2009). There is a fundamental 
requirement to outline security based on the needs of a specific organisation 
(Bishop, 2003). However, there is a similar understanding of what entails being 
secure or not. Consequently, broad established requirements and their 
corresponding key performance indicators can be expressed. This tactic has 
several advantages: It is easy to adopt the metric across diverse healthcare 
organisations to guarantee confident information sharing, and it influences 
cybersecurity validation enhancement. 
To assess the maturity level of the M2HCS model, a domain-specific 
cybersecurity metric for healthcare organisations (Jafari et al., 2010) was 
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adopted. The metric is domain-specific, but it is not custom made to a specific 
healthcare organisation’s cybersecurity programme, which would enable peer 
implementation and appraisal of metrics results.  
Cybersecurity metrics in this context possess three components: requirements, 
policy, and mechanisms (CIS Security Metrics-Quick Start Guide v1.0.0, 2010). 
Requirements describe security goals and objectives. Policy describes steps to 
reach these goals and objectives. Policy is derived from threat modelling, which 
can provide a variety of potential attack channels, some of which may be 
challenging to alleviate. Thus, other tactics like business continuity and recovery 
plans may be anticipated. Mechanisms put policy into effect and also refer to 
forms of protection (Schneier, 2004; ‘Security for Cloud Computing Ten Steps to 
Ensure Success Version 2.0’, 2015).  
Elements of the metrics include technology maturity analysis, threat analysis and 
modelling, requirements establishment, policies and mechanisms, and system 
behaviour. Technology maturity analysis offers minimum and maximum sets of 
tools appropriate for the healthcare organisation. This will ensure uniform 
application of threat modelling, requirements, and comparable metrics results to 
monitor technology implementation. Threat analysis and modelling are contained 
in technology maturity analysis results. These are based on three assumptions: 
healthcare organisations strive to diminish attack surfaces; for each threat, there 
may be many ways to contain the situation; and healthcare organisations can 




A generic set of requirements is formulated from threat analysis, regulations, and 
best practises. Each healthcare organisation devises its own policy and chooses 
a set of mechanisms to implement that policy. If the threat analysis assumptions 
are true, then the measurement process must entirely assess the policies and 
mechanisms to ensure comparable results. Lastly, information on incident 
tendencies and successful attacks are to be collected and analysed, and 
information related to operational behaviour must be monitored.  
Table 5.Error! Reference source not found.5 (below) illustrates letting T be t
hreat modelling results, R be a generic set of requirements, and Sp be a set of 
values depicting security posture of a measured healthcare organisation. Let P 
be a set of policy-describing requirements, R, and let M be a set of mechanisms 
for enforcing policy P. For a single set of requirements R, organisations may 
deduce several policies: Pi: i = 1, 2, p. For each policy Pi, several different 
mechanisms can be derived: Mj: j = 1, 2, m, where m ≥ n. It is expected that, at 
minimum, Sp can reveal relatively comparable results if P and M are assessed 
entirely and R is made to fulfil T. Since security is a process (Schneier, 2004), it 
is important to include general performance indicators for P and M. Thus, Sp is 










 Generic Requirements (R) 
 Derived from threat 
modelling (T) 





Systems acquisition and configuration 
 Machine monitoring 
 Patch management 
 Systems upgrade, … 
   
Usage scenarios 
 Access control levels 
 Policy violations 
 Identification & 
authorization, … 
   
Incident reports 
 Number of 
blocked/unblocked attacks, 
… 
   
Table 5.5 Elements of Security Posture (Jafari et al., 2010) 
To avoid measurement distortion, the cybersecurity metric tries maintain these 
challenging characteristics (Herrmann, 2007; Jaquith, 2007):  
 Precision: the extent that repeatable, concise results can be demonstrated 
for several measurements taken under similar conditions  
 Accuracy: the degree of agreement of individual or average 
measurements with an accepted reference value or level  
 Validity: degree to which it measures what was intended to be measured 
 Correctness: the degree of formality adhered to during the measurement 
process  
 Cost effectiveness: that metrics data must be inexpensive to gather in 
terms of time and cost, and preferably gathered automatically  
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M2HCS is a model that healthcare organisations can use to secure these 
characteristics and cloud capabilities connected with their processes. As the 
healthcare organisation progresses from one maturity level to the next, the variety 
of benefits from improvement practises increases significantly. This is because 
progresses from each maturity level addresses various elements of security in 
eHealth cloud, and different remunerations occur at each level.  
5.4 Senior Management Support  
An important success factor for a good cybersecurity metric is the support and 
active involvement of executive management (Elizabeth Chew et al., 2008). The 
lack of a good model for mapping IS metrics to the specified setting, and plainly 
explaining the quantitative measures, results in security assessors frequently 
struggling to find a concession between reporting metrics that are too technical 
for the senior management and ones that damage the use of a metric due to 
generalisation (Mimoso, 2009). The M2HCS model and its metrics present a 
qualitative and quantitative assessment of the cloud security of the healthcare 
organisation. For executives, it provides a detailed security assessment of the 
eHealth cloud to aid in decision making. For security experts, its quantitative 
metrics support proactive and reactive processes. 
5.5 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the development methodology process of the M2HCS 
model and metrics. Further descriptions of the model in this chapter include a 
logical approach that includes a detailed method for assessment (model 
matrix/table), a metrics framework, and an adopted healthcare-domain-specific 
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metric tool. The model includes relevant aspects of healthcare cloud security and 
plainly describes what individual levels mean for each control. Its descriptions are 
focussed on practises. Individual control is measured as a capability maturity, 
letting a healthcare organisation measure where they are with respect to a 
particular security control and to assess improvement over time or against a goal, 
even if it is ongoing. The security model matrix/table can also be used as a list of 
commendations to detail how the healthcare organisation may attain its cloud 
security objectives. Each domain, with its set of controls for each maturity level, 
is clearly defined. Lastly, M2HCS can be used for observing intra-organisational 
cloud security over time, measuring progress made by the organisation’s policies, 
and attaining a goal recognised through study of similar healthcare organisations’ 
cloud security proficiencies. 
The following chapter discusses the validation of the proposed model by IT 
healthcare experts, which, in turn, informs the formulation of a prototype system 












6 Validation of Maturity Model for Healthcare Cloud Security  
This chapter describes the validation step of Design Science Research 
Methodology, which considers the validation process one of the most central 
aspects of research. This ensures the development of a solution step because it 
is the validation process that authenticates the contribution of the solution, along 
with its usefulness, value, and ability in regard to the acknowledged problem 
(Hevner et al., 2004).  
6.1 Validation Strategy 
The validation strategy of the proposed model, Maturity Model for Healthcare 
Cloud Security (M2HCS), and its metrics was carried out by means of:  
1. A case study  
2. Survey/interviews with practitioners  
3. Feedback from the scientific community through the submission and 
presentation of academic papers  
Results ascertained that M2HCS offers a suitable and strong progression method 
and is dependable when it comes to improving functioning healthcare cloud 
security services. These validation methods are further explained below:  
 Case study: A fabricated scenario to prove the model and its use to resolve 
the research problem. Its objectives include validating the proposed 
controls and domains by adding or removing them from the model matrix, 
which is expected to make advances to the model, and collect information 
related to the processes used to manage security services in the eHealth 
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cloud to perform the assessments. M2HCS was applied to an NHS Trust 
University Teaching Hospital, from which a case study was fabricated. 
 Survey and interview: Collected feedback through survey and interviews 
with practitioners regarding the model, capacity to follow its stages, and 
potential to achieve appropriate results. Its objectives are the same as the 
case study’s (above). Furthermore, the execution of the online survey and 
its applicability were discussed. Six of the experts involved in the survey 
were asked further questions in interviews.  
 Scientific publications: Submit research papers to obtain a review from the 
scientific community. 
This validation method follows the design validation guideline within DSRM 
(Hevner et al., 2004). In conclusion, after the completion of the steps in this 
validation process, adequate information can be collected to resolve the 
uncertainty of returning to modify the prior objectives/controls defined for the 
model or perform amendments to the proposed metrics, continue onward, and 
communicate the results of this research.  
6.2 Survey and Interview 
This section discusses the means through which the survey and interviews were 
piloted and presents the results gathered in the course of that procedure. To 
assess the proposed and crucial objectives/control activities, the researcher 
established six surveys and conducted semi-structured interviews with relevant 
experts. The opinions of the expert participants were particularly useful because 
they included both clients and suppliers. The suppliers interact with a wide range 
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of clients and, thus, have knowledge about what the clients must do to secure 
and manage their services in the eHealth cloud. The clients are the real end users 
of the models, so they provided information based on the present security needs 
in their healthcare organisations. 
The purpose of these surveys and ensuing interviews was to enquire, of 
individuals with expertise regarding the application and optimisation of electronic 
healthcare cloud security services, whether or not the M2HCS is viable and valid. 
Error! Reference source not found. provides information about the expertise a
nd roles of the survey participants. Their roles and locations are listed in the first 
column. In the second column, the expertise of each participant is given to define 
the reason he or she was suited to offer an expert view. Error! Reference source n
ot found. also presents the scales of measurement for the survey. 
 Background of Study Participants 
The study participants were identified through a web search of the appropriate 
persons with roles in security assessment and management in eHealth cloud, 
health IT departments, research contributions in health informatics, and the field 
as a whole. An e-mail consisting of a letter of introduction and purpose of the 
survey was sent to the seventy individuals selected for participation; six people 
responded. These six experts agreed to partake in the survey. However, three 
who contributed to the survey declined to partake in subsequent interviews as 
they were not available. Table 6.1 presents the pre-assessment information 
about the participants of the survey. Their contributions in forms of survey and 




























Professor WH Medical 
informatics 
15 Academia Yes External 
COO DOB Cybersecurity 12 Cybersecurity 
Industry 
Yes External 




Table 6.1 Pre-Assessment Information about the Participants 
The interviews consisted of online meetings (making use of Skype) and the 
survey questionnaire. At the beginning of the Skype meeting, the researcher 
presented the objectives of the survey questionnaire and a brief justification of 
the need for the ensuing interview. During the survey, the participants were asked 
to evaluate the set of domains and key controls/objective activities in the maturity 
model M2HCS, using the scale presented. The participants were also asked to 
further expound on their survey responses and propose modifications or add-ons 
to the existing set of domains and key controls/objective practises to better adapt 
them for the eHealth cloud security maturity assessment. The following sections 
present the results from the surveys and interviews (Section 6.2.3) and the 
influence of this feedback on the proposed model (Section 6.2.4).  
Given the detailed scope of the research, it was very important to speak to 
relevant experts in the field who would offer informed assessments on the 
challenges of eHealth cloud security practises in hospitals (Table 6.2). With the 
limited number of participants, the use of additional interviews was considered. 
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However, given the schedules and availability of the participants, conducting the 
interviews would have required more time beyond the .submission of this thesis.  
For reporting purposes, and to protect participants’ identities, each participant 
was assigned a pseudonym to ensure their anonymity. Participants of the survey 
study were assigned the codes PR, WH, LBS, BK, DOB, and NO, respectively. 
At the time of the study, the participants contributed differing amounts of 
information about the domains’ key activities. Some talked at length about one 
domain, whilst others made nearly equal contributions across all five domains. 
However, it was ensured that all participants’ voices and views are represented 




















He has over 30 years’ experience as an expert in implementation of clinical 
systems in large healthcare organisations and the management of health 
information systems, including senior ICT management roles as CIO in a 
university hospital and as IT manager of hospitals. He has performed in 
consulting roles, including a validation of and report on global best practises 
for digitised healthcare decision support. He has broad experience in 
managing telehealth initiatives, including the Telehealth Pilot Programme and 





A director of informatics in the largest acute academic hospital with corporate 
responsibility for information communication technology (ICT), He acted on 
the National Integrated Medical Imaging System (one of the largest single 
PACS/RIS solution implementations in the world) Project for the Health 
Services Executive. In addition to his academic appointments, research 
interests in health informatics, several peer-reviewed publications and 




He currently works at a company that provides computational solutions for 
better decision making and knowledge management in health care industry. 
He has been involved in European projects, such as MedBioinformatics 
H2020, European Medical Information Framework Platform (IMI), and EU-
ADR. As a researcher, he has worked on projects related to sharing more 
than 30 million medical images in distributed environments and cloud 
computing. He has specialities in large-scale storage and databases (cloud 
computing such as AWS, Azure, Google AppENgine, RackSpace), medical 
networks, and medical imaging experience (healthcare sector). 
Professor 
(USA) 
He is a professor in the department of radiological sciences and a member of 
a medical imaging and informatics group. His research specialities include 
predictive modelling, population health management, and imaging 
informatics. He is an active member of the American Medical Informatics 




He has specialities in ensuring effective and engaging security awareness 
programmes, critical infrastructure protection, information governance, risk, 
compliance, security audit, ethical hacking, incident management, ISMS, 




An experienced security and privacy officer working for a large global 
organization developing medical products and services. Currently working on 
defining corporate policies and requirements, processes, regulations, and 
standards, performing privacy and security impact assessments, event 
management, auditing, and developing common tools and technologies. This 
programme ensures that they are implemented to safeguard medical devices 
and services that are in compliance with legislative and healthcare 
requirements and resilient against cyberattacks.  
Table 6.2 Summary of the Research Participants 
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 Survey and Interview Protocol  
 The researcher explained what the research is about in an electronic e-
mail and ‘Information’ document. The participants’ consent was read and 
signed by clicking the ‘Agree’ button in the ‘Questionnaire’ document (refer 
to Appendix C for a sample of this document).  
 A few pre-assessment (stated as ‘Respondent Details’) questions (Table 
6.1) Error! Reference source not found.were asked in the ‘
Questionnaire’ document. They are as follow: 
o What best describes your current position? 
o What is your background: academia, healthcare, cloud security, 
cybersecurity? 
o How many years of experience do you have in this field? 
o Do you have any experience in healthcare cloud/cybersecurity? If 
so, how many years?  
o What was the type of healthcare facility: general/acute-care 
hospital, community health centre, district hospital, specialised 
hospital, teaching hospital, clinics, private healthcare centre? 
o Have you participated previously in cloud/cybersecurity maturity 
assessment? Type of assessment?: yes, no, internal (within an 
organisation), external (outside an organisation) 
 The conceptual framework established in section 5.2 was used to give 
details about the elementary subcomponents of the model M2HCS.  
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 The conceptual framework was used to describe and assess the 
appropriateness of the proposed model. The researcher made this 
process easier by providing detailed information about the elementary 
subcomponents of M2HCS. By doing this, the survey participants were 
acquainted with the comprehensive information about the domains, 
maturity levels, and objectives of the proposed model.  
 The interview participants provide answers to the assessment questions. 
 The survey questionnaire utilised the Likert scale (Error! Reference s
ource not found.) and ‘Further information’ question types. A question 
was asked, for which the scale provides four possible responses:  
o Strongly Disagree 
o Disagree 
o Agree 
o Strongly Agree  
The Likert scale supports the researcher by providing possible answers ranging 
from 4 (strongly agree) to 1 (strongly disagree) to indicate whether the survey 
participants agreed or disagreed with each question to measure the ‘Further 
information’ provided on a certain statement. The Likert scale was also chosen 
because it is a familiar interface used in many surveys. The conversant structure 








Table 6.3 Scale Used in the Survey 
 Survey and Interview Results  
This section presents the data collected during the design and development step 
of DSRM. The key objective was to validate the domains and objectives/control 
activities used in the proposed model, M2HCS, and to better adapt it to the 
electronic healthcare cloud through the deletion, addition, or modification of these 
domains and practises. The outcomes of the survey are shown in the following 
section.  
 Maturity Model Validation Feedback 
To satisfy the model’s operational characteristics (OC), the researcher provided 
data about how the proposed maturity model, M2HCS, is presently effective 
regarding applicability to electronic healthcare cloud security assessment (OC1). 
Therefore, the researcher has included the questions below to achieve that (at 
the beginning of the assessment in Error! Reference source not found.). The f
eedback revealed that the majority of the participants agreed (chose ‘Agree’) with 
the maturity model validating questions, with an overall mean of 2.88. 
Questions Mean of 
Feedbacks 
Are the domains relevant for the assessment of maturity within a 
healthcare organisation? 
3.0 
Are the objectives relevant? 3.0 
How feasible would it be to assess these objectives in practise? 3.0 
Can the maturity model be practically used in the healthcare industry? 2.5 
Overall mean: 3.0 + 3.0 + 3.0 + 2.5 = 2.88 
Table 6.4 Maturity Model Validation Feedback 
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There was strong agreement amongst survey participants concerning many of 
the survey questions. After the pre-assessment questions, questions were asked 
to validate the overall model. The researcher established from all the responses 
of the survey participants that the domains are relevant for the assessment of 
maturity within a healthcare organisation (OC4). All the survey participants chose 
the ‘Agree’ option; however, some made recommendations to better adapt the 
relevance of domains for the assessment of maturity within the context:  
Agree, but would recommend to call out at least supplier management and 
acquisition as a separate domain or include it as an item in all domains as there 
are requirements for that in each of them as they are now somewhat hidden in 
the domains.  
Furthermore, the survey participants chose the ‘Agree’ option as to the relevancy 
of the objectives/activities (OC3):  
Agree, but need a clear distinction between the objectives of the organization and 
how to achieve them as for cloud some are internal, some are external (which 
means internal needs to spec and check). 
Thirdly, all survey participants chose the ‘Agree’ option for the feasibility of 
assessing these objectives/activities in practise (OC4): 
Agree in that it would be feasible to assess the objectives, although some need 
better descriptions as they are not clearly stated as an objective. 
The last question assessed the validation of the overall model by determining its 
practicality in the healthcare industry (OC1):  
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Agree mostly because of the setup but disagree mainly because of the structure. 
Healthcare providers are being pushed by regulations (e.g. GPDR and NIS) 
towards appropriate security and privacy management. Often this is done 
towards established security frameworks like ISO 27001. As there are already 
recognized standards in the area of cloud computing (ISO/IEC 27017) and health 
IT (ISO/IEC 27799), I would like to recommend something that could be mapped 
against the high-level structure and these ISO standards.  
 Domain, Maturity Levels, Objectives Validation Feedback 
In the next section, questions were asked to validate the operational 
characteristics of the objectives/activities. The four questions were answered with 
varying opinions from survey participants. Further discussions of these outcomes 
are given below.  
From the first question, the researcher established from all the responses of the 
survey participants that each domain’s objectives/activities were correctly 
assigned to maturity levels for the proper assessment of maturity within a 
healthcare organisation. All the survey participants chose the ‘Agree’ option. 
 The other questions about each domain’s objectives defining progression across 
maturity levels, modification/realignment of each domain’s objectives, and 
research designated choice of each domain’s core objectives resulted in varying 
outcomes (outlined in Error! Reference source not found.). The domain, m
aturity levels, objectives, and validation feedback (Error! Reference source not 
found.) revealed that the majority of the participants chose between a variance 
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of ‘Agree’ and ‘Disagree’ for the maturity model validating questions, with an 




Questions Mean of 
Feedback 
Do you consider the descriptions correctly assigned to their respective maturity 
levels? 
3.0 
Do you consider the controls appropriate for defining levels? 2.0 
Do you consider the core control descriptions appropriate to maintain a maturity 
level? 
2.3 
Overall mean: 3.0 + 2.0 + 2.3 = 2.43 
Table 6.5 Domain/Maturity Levels/Objectives Validation Feedback 
Questions IAM IRM ERM PeS PhS 




to their respective 
maturity level? 
Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree 






Disagree Agree Disagree Agree Disagree 
Do you consider 
each domain’s core 
objectives/activities 
appropriate to 
attain the maturity 
level? 
Disagree Agree Agree Agree Agree 
Which of each 
domain’s 
objectives/activities 















































then it could 
remain. 
Table 6.6 Survey Outcomes from Participants on Domains 
 Influence of Feedback on Proposed Maturity Model 
In this segment, the researcher utilised the survey participants’ feedback 
(presented earlier) and performed an analysis on it to gain realistic knowledge for 
the construction of the proposed maturity model for healthcare cloud security. 
The Likert scale ratings (Error! Reference source not found.) were used to a
ssess the survey participants’ validation feedback (section 6.2.3.1). The Likert 
scale rated the response to each question and the overall mean to find the survey 
participants’ overall feedback for each validation question during the analysis. 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the survey feedback to validate the p
roposed maturity model. All of the six survey participants provided feedback on 
the applicability and effectiveness of M2HCS in the assessment of security 
practises in a healthcare organisation actively using the electronic healthcare 
cloud. The rate of recurrence in the feedback revealed that most of the survey 
participants chose ‘Agree’ in response to most of the questions.  
Regarding the validation of the domain, maturity levels, and objectives, the survey 
feedback revealed that most of the participants chose the ‘Agree’ option to show 
that all the given aspects are essential to support significant activities in the 
framework of the proposed maturity model (OC4). The survey participants’ also 
confirmed the significance of each aspect’s constituents. The averages displayed 
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that the survey participants were in agreement with the questions, though some 
gave recommendations to add new, or remove or reshuffle, objectives. Four 
survey participants provided feedback to approve this requirement. The others 
emphasised the need to think through the skills and awareness of the security 
assessors involved in the healthcare organisation. Despite this, they all agreed 
by stating that from their assessment of M2HCS, it provides a guide using a well-
thought-out and methodical approach to the optimisation of security practises of 
electronic healthcare cloud (OC1).  
Furthermore, the survey participants also validated the proposed maturity 
model’s usability in relation to simplicity, clarity, practicality, elasticity, and 
competence (OC2). All six survey participants’ feedback established that the 
proposed maturity model and metrics are easy and natural to follow.  
Regarding the rationale for their views, the participants provided some comments 
to support their opinions, as follow:  
 All six survey participants’ feedback also acknowledged that executive 
decision makers could obtain their informed decisions from the 
assessment results and format (OC5).  
 It was mentioned that there should be a separate domain for supplier 
management or to include it as an objective/activity in all domains.  
 A need for clear distinctions between the objectives of the organisation 
and how to achieve them (OC3) were mentioned. As for cloud, some are 
internal and some external. 
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 Lastly, all six survey participants’ feedback further established that the 
proposed model, M2HCS, is not directly drawn from any other standards, 
technologies, or concrete implementation details. However, there were 
recommendations that M2HCS could be further mapped against related 
regulations because healthcare organisations are being pushed by 
regulations towards appropriate security and privacy management.  
6.3 Proposed Maturity Model Changes and Improvements  
For qualitative feedback, the validation of the framework of the maturity model 
contained open-ended statements to give participants an opportunity to express 
further comments and recommendations about how to update and improve the 
proposed model. The qualitative feedback contained the suggestions below:  
 Overall Maturity Model: Healthcare providers are being pushed by 
regulations (e.g. General Data Protection Regulation) towards appropriate 
security and privacy management. It was recommended that the proposed 
maturity model should be mapped to established security frameworks like 
Information Standards Organization (ISO) 27001, ISO 27017, ISO 27799, 
ISO 80001, and ISO 27005. 
 Incident & Response Management Domain: It was mentioned that some 
objectives/control activities were too prescriptive, making the subject fail 
to comply with the Incident response management requirements. The 
objectives/activities were refined to be clearly distinct and descriptive 
about how to achieve them. 
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 Identity Access Management Domain: Again, it was mentioned that some 
objectives/control activities were too prescriptive. The objectives/activities 
were refined to be clearly distinct and descriptive about how to achieve 
them. 
 Enterprise Risk Management Domain: All of the validation survey 
participants suggested relocation of data governance to this domain and 
stated that security governance should be added in this domain.  
 Personnel Security Domain: Most of the validation survey participants 
referred to the fact that ‘external personnel security’ should be rephrased 
to properly suit contractors. Third parties’ security (the rephrasing of 
‘external personnel security’) contained details about supplier 
management, as recommended in the feedback.  
 Physical Security Domain: Some of the validation survey participants 
commented that connected medical devices should not be included in 
physical security but rather under ERM, except if it is only focussed on 
segmentation, which in this case it was. 
The survey participants made the recommendations that needed to be addressed 
in the refinement of the proposed framework of M2HCS; these suggestions are 
reviewed in section 6.3.16.2.3.1 below. 
 Framework Refinement  
The validation process was designed to test whether the proposed framework 
could be used in the practical context of assessing security practises within 
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healthcare organisations actively using cloud by adding, removing, or modifying 
components, as shown in Figure 5.4. 
The recognised objectives for the proposed maturity model were validated 
through the survey, and the outcomes of the study are shown in Error! R
eference source not found.. 
As discussed, the survey participants recommended refining the framework of 
the proposed M2HCS. Therefore, their recommendations were deliberated on and 
put into this research to improve the framework of the proposed maturity model. 
These recommendations were painstakingly thought out, and the framework of 
the model was revised in this way: 
  Maturity Model: It was mapped to present high-level compliance to earlier 
recommended standards. This is because healthcare providers are being 
pushed by regulations towards appropriate security and privacy 
management. The recommended standards, ISO/IEC 27017 and ISO/IEC 
27799, are considered established security frameworks that are complied 
with by healthcare organisations using cloud deployments (OC1).  
 IRM Domain: Its objectives were thoroughly reviewed, and prescriptive 
descriptions were turned into high-level descriptions to allow flexibility 
when making the choice of solutions to be implemented. The objectives 
were refined to be clearly distinct and descriptive about how to achieve 
them (OC3). 
 IAM Domain: Its objectives were thoroughly reviewed, and prescriptive 
descriptions were turned into high-level descriptions to allow flexibility 
when making the choice of solutions to be implemented. The 
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objectives/activities were refined to be clearly distinct and descriptive 
about how to achieve them (OC3). 
 ERM Domain: Data governance was transferred to this domain and 
renamed ‘information assurance’. This choice was made to cover both 
data governance and clinical/corporate governance.  
 PeS Domain: External personnel security was changed to ‘third parties’ 
security’. This objective would encapsulate the contractors, external 
personnel, and suppliers.  
 PhS Domain: Connected medical devices remained in this physical 
security domain. This was because its activities were mainly focussed on 
segmentation only. 
Domains Objectives/Controls Refinement 
Recommendations 
IRM (Incident Response & 
Management) 
Firewall configurations  
Data governance Transferred to ERM domain 
Disaster recovery (DR) DR/business continuity 
Incident response (IR) IR &containment 
Patch management  
Incident report management  
 Incident preparation 
 Incident detection & analysis 
IAM (Identity & Access 
Management) 
Authorization & access control  
Log off of system users Safety regarding lockout 
Mobile device management  
Identity federation & 
provisioning 
 
ERM (Enterprise Resource 
Management) 
Data governance Information assurance 
Event identification  
Risk control & monitoring  
Risk assessment & response  
PeS (Personnel Security) External personnel security Third parties’ security 
 Awareness training  
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 Hospital organisation culture  
  Human resources 
PhS (Physical Security) Cloud storage  Cloud storage security 
Connected medical device  
Table 6.7 Refinement of M2HCS framework 
The revised scheme of the proposed maturity model to assess, maintain, and 
improve a healthcare organisation’s effective cloud security practises is 

















Identity & Access 
Enterprise Risk 
Incident & Response 
Personnel Security 
Level 1 




















Connected medical device, Cloud storage security, Awareness training for employees, 
Third parties’ security, Hospital organizational culture, Human resource, Event 
identification, Risk control and monitoring, Risk assessment and response, Information 
assurance, Risk management, Authorization & access control, Lock out procedures, 
Mobile device management, Identity federation and provisioning, Firewall 
configurations, Disaster recovery & business continuity, Incident response & 
containment, Incident reporting management, Usability and functionality 





Figure 6.1 Revised M2HCS 
 
6.4 Practical Validation of the Research Findings  
In addition to the previous validation approach, the researcher decided to further 
assess the proposed maturity model in a real-case scenario. Therefore, a single 
case scenario was developed and used to further examine the practicality of 
using the proposed model for healthcare cloud security in an everyday healthcare 
organisation actively employing cloud services. The case scenario considered an 
NHS Trust University Teaching Hospital in the United Kingdom, which was 
implementing some cloud computing services. To do this, their security practises 
were obtained from their web-based published policy documents. Afterwards, an 
instrument was designed and developed that assisted the decision maker 
(researcher) in assessing the identified cloud security practises of this hospital 
based on M2HCS. Lastly, the identified security practises were improved by 
implementing the recommendations obtained from the use of the healthcare-
domain-specific metrics/framework. 
This proposed maturity model was designed and developed for analysis 
purposes. Nevertheless, its potential is extensive, and it can be used to: 
 support decision makers in their assessment of security practises in 
healthcare organisations actively using cloud services  
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 enlighten decision makers about the existing maturity levels of security 
practises in their healthcare organisations actively using cloud services 
 educate decision makers about their healthcare organisation’s weak and 
strong security practises within each domain of the proposed maturity 
model  
 provide recommendations for decision makers to improve their healthcare 
organisation’s weak security practises in cloud services implementation 
based on their identified maturity rating 
 prioritise the provided recommendations based on available resources 
within the healthcare organisation 
Thus, M2HCS is metrics framework useful in the decision process for assigning 
maturity levels.  
 Demonstration of Case Study Stage 
This section relates to the demonstration step of DSRM. To demonstrate the 
model M2HCS, it was applied it to some security practises of an NHS Trust 
University Teaching Hospital in the United Kingdom. For this case study 
demonstration, efforts were made to present an all-inclusive description of the 
specified security practises of the model. In section 6.4.3, the case-study 
hospital’s cloud security assessment and summary are discussed, and a 
proposal for the improvement of its cloud security practises is based on obtained 
results and main conclusions.  
This case study was chosen because the healthcare organisation was 
considered a representative of the average NHS Trust University Teaching 
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Hospital. The study seeks to measure the applicability of M2HCS to a real 
healthcare organisation It was expected that it could provide ways to improve 
their maturity levels as this would also improve its security practises and 
processes and, in effect, its healthcare delivery. To conduct these 
demonstrations, the models was applied to specified practises of the hospital 
(which has more than 100,000 admissions per year).  
The researcher obtained information from the healthcare organisation’s website 
and conducted a review of their current policies guiding their current security 
practises to formulate a case study. The case study describes the application of 
the model, emphasising physical security, personnel security, risk management, 
network infrastructure security, medical devices use and management, 
information security, information governance, incident management, and data 
protection practises and how they are being applied in the hospital. Finally, the 
model’s metrics were applied to assess these practises and propose 
improvements.  
 Case Study 
The initial phase was to report the activities implemented by the case-study 
hospital, based on policy documents. From this, the researcher presented a 
manuscript together with the application of the security practises. Following that, 
the researcher made a distinction amongst the security practises and processes 
according to the maturity model’s domains, such as physical security, personnel 
security, enterprise risk management, incident response management, and 
identity, and access management. To achieve that, the researcher emphasised 
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the manuscript using bold, and italics to discuss the identified domains and 
practises, respectively. The researcher also used underline and brackets () to 
identify the objectives.  
The case-study hospital must continue making improvement in delivering the 
action plan to further develop its security practises and processes and meet 
requirements of the European Union General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), amongst other key legislations and standards for maintaining security in 
healthcare. From the policy documents, the following information was extracted 
and arranged in appropriate paragraphs based on the domains for the purpose 
of building a case study (Scott and Harder, 2017). The following paragraphs are 
directly quoted. 
[Incident Response Management] 
Suppliers are required to maintain and comply with a plan for business continuity 
and disaster recovery (incident reporting management) {4} for each of the goods 
and services it provides to the Trust, in order to mitigate, as far as reasonably 
possible, the impact of events or circumstances which could detrimentally affect 
the uninterrupted supply of the goods or provision of the services. Reviews the 
existence and effectiveness of the policy, systems and procedures (incident 
response and containment) {4} in place Trust-wide in respect of major incidents 
and business continuity arrangements to ensure that they are in line with current 
legislation. Where cost effective and appropriate, resilience are built in to the 
infrastructure to mitigate the failure of any one component. All connections to 
external networks are firewalled (firewall configurations) {2} and where necessary 
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include additional intrusion prevention measures. Incidents and faults with the 
network are recorded (incident reporting management) {3} within the Information 
Management & Technology business management system and the Information 
Management & Technology Service Desk (Scott and Harder, 2017). Incidents will 
be reported (incident reporting management) {3} on the Trust risk management 
system, and investigated accordingly.  
[Identity and Access Management] 
Where supported, network infrastructure device configurations are automatically 
collected and archived (mobile device management) {4} by a central 
management system. There is a documented and formal user registration and 
de-registration process for access to the network (authorization and access 
control) {3}, held by the hospital’s Information Management & Technology 
Service. Security privileges to the network are allocated on the requirements of 
the user’s job (authorization and access control) {3}, rather than on a status or 
any other basis and this is configured within Active Directory or individual 
systems. User access rights are removed or reviewed for those users who have 
left the Trust or changed jobs (authorization and access control) {3} and user 
accounts are disabled automatically if not used in 100 days and deleted after a 
further 61 days. Only equipment approved by the Hospitals IM&T Service is 
permitted to connect to the network and all equipment is registered (mobile device 
management) {3} with the ICT Configuration Management Database (CMDB) 





[Enterprise Risk Management] 
The Hospital’s Information Management & Technology Service carries out 
security risk assessment(s) that covers all the aspects of the network (risk 
management) {2} in relation to supporting all the business processes. The risk 
assessment also detects all the applicable, cost-effective security 
countermeasures necessary (event identification) {2} to protect against possible 
breaches in confidentiality, integrity and availability. Risk management is covered 
within the CCA 2004 and is the first step in the emergency planning and business 
continuity process. It ensures that local responders make plans that are sound 
and proportionate to risks. Risk assessments can be undertaken through a 
specific planned process (risk assessment and response) {3} at Corporate, Care 
Group or Service Line level. A risk should be recorded to Datix and for each risk 
that cannot be resolved immediately an action plan to eliminate, minimise or 
accept the risk (risk assessment and response) {4} is required. The actions must 
be recorded on Datix together with the risk grading following completion of the 
action plan. Risks must be monitored at the appropriate level (risk control and 
monitoring) {3} in accordance with the review, approval and escalation process 
(Scott and Harder, 2017). 
[Physical Security] 
Network computer equipment is housed in a secure environment. Entry to secure 
areas housing critical or sensitive network equipment is restricted (cloud storage 
security) {2} to those whose job requires it. Critical or sensitive network equipment 
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is housed in an environment that is monitored for temperature and power supply 
(cloud storage security) {2} quality. Critical or sensitive network equipment is 
housed in secure areas, protected by a secure perimeter with appropriate security 
barriers and entry controls (cloud storage security) {2}. The most effective method 
of controlling access is to restrict the number of Authorisers. Ideally, there will be 
one Door Access Card Authoriser per speciality/department (cloud storage 
security) {2} (Scott and Harder, 2017).  
[Personnel Security] 
The healthcare organization ensures sufficient staff are aware and trained in the 
requirements detailed in relevant emergency response plans (awareness and 
training) {3}—including business continuity arrangements, Major Incident Plan 
and relevant emergency response plans. Third party access to the network is 
restricted only to those devices or systems deemed necessary and appropriate 
(third parties’ security) {4} and all such access to the network is logged for audit 
(third parties’ security) {3} purposes. The Human Resources and Organisational 
Development Directorate is responsible for managing the process of induction for 
new staff and delivery of Mandatory Training to all staff (awareness and training) 
{3}. Ensures that new temporary and agency staff are provided with a Local 
Induction. Ensures that staff transferring from other locations within the Trust are 
provided with relevant elements of the Local Induction, and that this is recorded 
on the Local Induction checklist. Ensure staff complete Mandatory and Update 
Training (awareness and training) {3}, through review of reports provided by the 
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Workforce Development Team and detailed review of the Workforce 
Development drive (Scott and Harder, 2017).  
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 Case Study Assessment 
The stages of the decision process measures are presented in the assessment 
and analysis explained below (OC2).  
Stage 1: The assessor (researcher) obtained the healthcare organisation’s web-
based published business strategic direction and its related key risks, according 
to different practises, in a document called ‘Board Assurance Framework (BAF)’. 
It is the key strategic tool for the management of risks and assurance. In addition, 
written records of information were collected about the healthcare organisation’s 
existing cybersecurity policies and activities. In this stage, the five domains and 
the four maturity levels were used to assess these domains and assess the 
electronic healthcare cloud security practises in the healthcare organisation 
(OC4).  
Stage 2: The objectives for all domains were identified (OC3). In this stage, the 
sub-dimensions (objectives) used to assess the domains for electronic healthcare 
cloud security in the healthcare organisation were defined. In this case study, the 
researcher emphasised the manuscript using bold, and italics were used to 
discuss the identified domains and practises, respectively. Each practise mapped 
against the maturity model’s matrix supported the identification of the objectives. 
The researcher emphasised the manuscript using underline and brackets () to 
identify the objectives. 
Stage 3: Elements identified were surveyed and measured. To measure the 
electronic healthcare cloud security in the healthcare organisation, the objectives 
are measured and assessed based on the multiple statements of activities. 
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However, in this case study, there were no multiple statements of activities since 
it was drawn from policy documents by a single assessor. 
Stage 4: Using the information collected in the second and third steps, the rating 
was created for the maturity level of each objective. After measuring each 
objective of electronic healthcare cloud security in the healthcare organisation, 
the maturity level for each objective was assigned based on its particular 
statement(s) of activities. The researcher emphasised the manuscript using 
brackets {} to identify the ratings of identified objectives. 
 Stage 5: The maturity level for each domain was calculated. After calculating all 
the objectives of the domains, the maturity level for each domain was calculated 
(OC1) based on the average of all its objectives’ maturity rates (Error! Reference s
ource not found.).  
Identified M2HCS Domains Sum of Objectives’ Ratings/ 




Incident & Response Management 16/5 3.2  
Identity Access Management 8/3 2.7  
Enterprise Risk Management 14/5 2.8  
Personnel Security 16/5 3.2  
Physical Security 16/5 3.2  
Table 6.8 Maturity Ratings for Each Domain 
Afterwards, the overall maturity level for all the domains in the proposed maturity 
model was calculated. The overall maturity level is the average of the maturity of 
all the domains.  
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The final maturity level was calculated with this formula:  
where 𝛽 denotes final maturity level, ∑ denotes summation of domain levels, 𝑑 
denotes domain, 𝐿 denotes level for each domain, and N denotes numbers of 
domain. The final maturity level obtained from the assessment of this case study 
is  
β = ⅀(3.2+2.7+2.8+3.2+3.2)/5 = 3.02 ≃ 3. 
Stage 6: This stage checked for additional information obtained; there was none 
in this case study, so the process proceeded. 
Stage 7: A list of practises was proposed to support the hospital in its progress in 
the maturity rating of its electronic healthcare cloud security (OC6). Using the 
M2HCS maturity model matrix, security practises above their current ratings were 
reviewed in line with their resources to develop their progress (OC7). 
Stage 8: The progressive practises were placed in order of implementation to 
produce improved security policies and processes in the healthcare organisation. 
This was achieved using the method proposed in section 6.4.4 (OC7). 
Based on these processes, legal requirements, and best practises, a set of 
recommendations was made to offer mechanisms for improving their maturity. It 
is important to note that the assessment also considered the case study’s security 
policies and mechanisms defined to implement the policies. This allowed the 
organisation to assess the effectiveness of its security policies and improve them.  
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 Improving Maturity 
By evaluating current cybersecurity abilities using M2HCS, the case organisation 
can determine its main concerns to promote its progression along the maturity 
model. It is likely that a healthcare organisation will need to take incremental 
steps in its maturity progression because there are finite resources available. The 
hospital could use the following method for progression: 
 Define selected capability domain, e.g. incident response management. 
 Choose control within capability domain, e.g. data governance.  
 Define accessible resources for improvement.  
 Understand defined processes needed to move the healthcare 
organisation from one maturity level to the next; e.g. to get from level one 
to two for data governance, the healthcare organisation must have their 
data mostly centralised and bureaucratic. 
 Develop an action plan to fulfil maturity criteria. 
 Implement the action plan. 
 Refine as needed. 
The M2HCS cybersecurity assessment model provides a reusable process for 
any healthcare organisation to employ. It is possible for an organisation to 
advance in more than one domain at once.  
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 Presentation of the M2HCS Framework Prototype 
As part of the practical validation, the researcher went further to test the 
practicality of the research findings in the formulated case study. Therefore, the 
case study was further used to observe the feasibility of using the maturity model 
for healthcare cloud security. To do this, the M2HCS framework prototype was 
designed and developed to support stakeholders in evaluating cloud security 
practises in their healthcare organisations, based on the proposed maturity model 
and assessment matrix. This proposed prototype (OC5) was intended for testing 
purposes; however, its potential is extensive, and it can be used to:  
 Support stakeholders in their decision making related to eHealth cloud 
security practises 
 Inform stakeholders about the existing level of maturity of their eHealth 
cloud security practises in their healthcare organisations 
 Inform stakeholders about the strengths and weaknesses when assessed 
by each domain of the maturity model 
 Allow stakeholders to improve maturity of eHealth cloud security practises 
by recognising their target level and processes for improvement  
The proposed prototype was developed using WAMP, a software stack that 
consists of Apache 2.4.37—PHP 5.6.40, 7.0.33, 7.1.26, 7,1.30, 7.2.19, 7.2.14, 
7.3.1, 7.3.6—MySQL 5.7.24—MariaDB 10.3.12—PhpMyAdmin 4.8.4—Adminer 
4.7.0—PhpSysInfo 3.2.10 on Windows operating system. A Windows web 
development software allows creation of web applications using a virtual server, 
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saving the need for hosting. Apache is the server software responsible for serving 
web pages. When a page is requested to be seen, Apache grants the request 
over HTTP and shows the site. MySQL is the database management system for 
the Apache server. It stores all of the relevant information like the site’s content, 
user profiles, and so forth. PHP is the programming language that acts like glue 
for the software stack. PHP runs by combining with Apache and communicating 
with MySQL (Bourdon, 2019). 
Furthermore, the plan of user-friendly interfaces was considered in this study to 
improve the usability of the pages, but this was not the focus. The key 
screenshots of the prototype are accessible below for illustration. These 
screenshots provide information about the procedure, which entailed the use of 




 Create account and user sign-in using username and password to access 
the M2HCS framework prototype (Figure 6.2). 
 
Figure 6.2 Screenshot of the Login Form 
 Start the assessment process (Figure 6.3). 
 
Figure 6.3 Sample of Assessment Process 
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 Present the results of the healthcare cloud security assessment and 
proffer ways of how to improve each domain (Figure 6.4). 
 
Figure 6.4 Result Page of the Assessment 
 Table with link to access details of previous assessments (Figure 6.5). 
 
Figure 6.5 Previous Assessment Results 
This prototype was developed to further validate the viability and validity of the 
proposed maturity model.  
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6.5 Academic Peer Review  
Academic peer review is considered the foundation of academic publication and 
communication. ‘It is the practise of engaging relevant experts to read and 
provide a critical review on new research in the academic fields which they study 
to validate and endorse its contribution to knowledge’. Peer review maintains the 
excellence and validity of individual articles and the journals that publish them. It 
is an indispensable tool for making distinctions between what is truly scientific 
and what is speculation (Kelly, Sadeghieh and Adeli, 2014).  
A number of research outputs were produced alongside the study course. These 
outputs were submitted for academic peer review, which further buttresses the 
validation of the research outputs. Each of these research outputs is directed to 
a certain set of research objectives, as indicated in section 1.3. 
The three research outputs (Error! Reference source not found.) serve as e
vidence of external justification. The researcher (Balogun and Papadaki, 2018), 
under supervision of Maria Papadaki, was presented to an international audience 
at the annual ICITST Conference (13th International Conference for Internet 
Technology and Secured Transactions) in the United Kingdom in December 
2018. This paper was extended into and accepted as a journal article (Akinsanya, 
Papadaki and Sun, 2019b). Another paper by the researcher is a result of the 
literature review study of M2HCS development (Akinsanya, Papadaki and Sun, 
2019a), which was accomplished under the supervision of Maria Papadaki. It was 
presented to an international audience at the annual CERC conference (9th 
Collaborative European Research Conference) in Germany in March 2019. The 
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M2HCS model was accepted and published as an original research paper to the 
International Journal of Information and Computer Security (IJICS).  
Title In-text reference Type of output 
Organisational Factors Influencing Medical 






Factors Limiting the Adoption of Cloud 






Current Cybersecurity Maturity Models: How 











Table 6.9 Research Outputs: External Validation 
6.6 Limitations of the Study  
Several factors would need to be considered before completely approving this 
methodology as a general methodology for healthcare cloud security maturity 
assessment. First, the case study was developed from policy documents, which 
may not reveal the real-life practises in the healthcare organisation. Secondly, 
the researcher has not considered the healthcare cloud security maturity 
assessment of observed organisations with other methodologies, tools, or 
approaches for healthcare cloud security maturity assessment to compare the 
outcomes. Lastly, the methodology has not been applied or validated in a real-
life healthcare organisation’s cloud security assessment practise, which is 
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planned by the NHS Trust University Teaching Hospital and occurs several times 
per year, controlled by different incidents and audit activities or the Board.  
6.7 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter presented and discussed the validation of the maturity model for 
healthcare cloud security (M2HCS) in view of the collected feedback. To conduct 
the validation process, these involved the demonstration and assessment of a 
case study to test the model’s real-life application. Afterwards, steps to improve 
the maturity of the case study were presented. Surveys and resulting interviews 
were used to gather experts’ feedback on the assessment of the maturity model. 
Prior to this, the backgrounds of the study participants were presented and 
discussed to reveal their suitability for this validation. Other strategies used were 
academic peer reviews from scientific publications. This validation has been 
successfully performed, as shown in the validation feedback from the experts that 






7 Research Overview 
This study has gone from identifying the main factors limiting the adoption of 
cloud computing for healthcare, which were mainly realised to be organisational 
applications of the security solutions, to reviewing cybersecurity maturity models 
that can be effective for assessing security applications within healthcare 
organisations actively using cloud computing. The central concerns identified are 
that most security maturity models were solely assessing compliance to a 
standard, which, in effect, does not provide an objective assessment result. In 
addition, security maturity models were only assessing individual IS components, 
which, in effect, does not reveal the overall security posture of the healthcare 
organisation. Therefore, in this thesis, the maturity model for healthcare cloud 
security is discussed as a holistic tool that incorporates sub-domains of 
healthcare security practises. This requires comprehensive healthcare 
organisational security strategy and programmes, which can be multifaceted but 
not necessarily appropriate for their cloud environments.  
However, in the literature, there are very few studies reporting on data 
governance for cloud service, despite its significant importance. Following this, 
the objective of the study was to create a more holistic model that can be used to 
produce and support a healthcare organisation’s security practises against 
cyberattacks, specifically in the cloud environments.  
To fulfil the research objectives, the study used the foundational capability and 
security maturity models (Savvides, 2009; NHS, 2011a; Spruit and Röling, 2014; 
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Giokas, Sekhon, Mestre, Geffen, Nouri and Twoekowski, 2015; Giokas, Sekhon, 
Mestre, Geffen, Nouri and Tworkowski, 2015; Le and Hoang, 2017) since they 
are well-known and tested models in cybersecurity and healthcare environments. 
They provided a well-defined, continuous approach for processes’ improvement 
and assessment. The novel contribution of the proposed model aims to support 
healthcare organisations in developing the maturity of their security practises 
against emerging cyber and cloud security attacks. Furthermore, it assesses the 
usability and functionality of the implemented security practises within each 
domain and the workflow of the healthcare organisation. The model is 
conceptualised at a high level, focussing on the characterisation of the maturity 
goals of cybersecurity for healthcare organisations using third-party or their own 
cloud services. The model allows assessment of present cybersecurity abilities 
and defines the main actions each healthcare organisation must perform to 
progress along the maturity curve to attain the optimisation stage. 
The research was conducted using Design Science Research Methodology, 
DSRM since its purpose was to construct and validate a healthcare cloud security 
maturity model (Hevner et al., 2004). The research process involved the analysis 
of relevant literature using a systematic approach, and the validation strategies 
included a demonstration using a case study based on the policy documents of 
an NHS Trust University Teaching Hospital to ensure the applicability of the 
maturity model in a real-life environment, collection of experts’ feedback on their 
assessment of the maturity model using survey questionnaires, and resulting 
interviews of survey participants. The feedback from the surveys and interviews 
was used to further improve the maturity model’s matrix. Another validation 
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strategy was academic peer review through submission to scientific publications. 
The combination of the foundational maturity models, methodology, and 
validation strategies have all supported a rigorous research process that resulted 
in solid findings, meeting all the thesis objectives. 
7.1 Communication 
This section relates to the communication step of DSRM that entails 
communicating to the appropriate audience the research on developing the 
maturity model, M2HCS, and its contributions. To communicate about the maturity 
model, the researcher wrote for scientific publications. This was also 
accomplished through the submission to a scientific journal and an international 
conference, as seen in section 5.6. 
The fist paper is based on the literature review results, which is the first step of 
this research, in which the researcher identified the main issues affecting the 
current cyber security maturity models and the foundational maturity models for 
the proposed model. The second paper presented the development processes 
and case study validation of the proposed maturity model, M2HCS, based on the 
policy documents of a UK NHS Trust University Teaching Hospital. 
7.2 Research Contributions and Findings 
The research process has led to a number of findings and contributions to 
knowledge. The main ones include the following: 
 Findings about eHealth cloud’s potential benefits to meet challenges for 
healthcare provisioning include support for patient-centricity healthcare 
service, real-time availability of data regardless of the geographical 
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locations and time difference, fostering collaboration amongst healthcare 
inter-organisations, information synchronisation and simultaneous 
sharing, and clinical research by providing computing storage. All these 
are based on the features of cloud.  
 Findings from conducted interviews about limiting factors in the adoption 
of cloud in healthcare presented technical, organisational, and legal 
challenges. The technical challenges include:  
o Data and service reliability, data and service availability, disaster 
recovery, transmission speed, web performance and latency, 
integration and interoperability, data portability and quality, and 
access control solutions suitable for clinical workflow.  
o Amongst these, the performance, reliability, and availability were 
considered crucial for medical practitioners, who cannot effectively 
operate unless their applications and patients’ data are available. 
o It is noteworthy that the technical cloud architects (TA1) type of 
cloud service providers provided the required technical security 
solutions for their data centres.  
 Findings about the organisational challenges included organisational 
changes, end users’ trust, and costs.  
o Costs were stated to be the crucial factor; these include the financial 
investments required to develop, implement, and maintain the eHealth 
cloud. Lack of service costs for required performance and high initial 
costs mainly deter the adoption of eHealth cloud.  
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 Findings about the legal challenges include contract law, intellectual property 
rights, data jurisdiction, and privacy. 
o Data jurisdiction was stated to be the major concern. There are limited 
legislations and guidelines for clinical, technical, and business 
practises of healthcare security practises in cloud.  
o Overall, the organisational challenges regarding the implementation of 
technical solutions were identified as the major limiting factors in 
adopting eHealth cloud. This overall finding, otherwise considered the 
initial research gap, defined the direction for the research onwards. 
 Findings from the study revealed the research is timely since there is 
presently a financial crisis such as ‘rising cost to provide healthcare 
services in the United Kingdom’ (Shaw, 2018). This study asserts that the 
adoption and implementation of eHealth cloud would reduce huge financial 
debts faced by many healthcare trusts.  
 Findings from the systematic review of foundational maturity models 
revealed the research gaps within the literature, addressed by the 
proposed model, M2HCS, include:  
o The lack of a security maturity model streamlined for eHealth cloud. 
o The other identified gaps in the review of these maturity models are 
in the aspect of adoption; the maturity models either are too 
complicated to implement or require the healthcare organisation’s 
processes to be refined to suit the model’s implementation. 
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 The novel contribution of this research is the proposal of the model. 
M2HCS, which is a high-level, holistic model that can be used to support 
and promote a healthcare organisation’s usable security practises against 
cyber and cloud security attacks.  
o It possesses five core indicators or domains: identity and access 
management (IAM), Incident response management (IRM), 
enterprise risk management (ERM), personnel security (PeS), and 
physical security (PhS). They address comprehensive features of 
cloud security.  
o M2HCS also incorporates usability and functionality objectives into 
its assessment of security practises to ensure usable security 
solutions are implemented. 
o M2HCS can support the assessment of security practises in the 
eHealth cloud (OC1). 
o M2HCS metrics can be followed easily and intuitively (OC2). 
o M2HCS descriptions of the objectives are clear and relate to the 
maturity levels (OC3). 
o M2HCS supports the assessment of the maturity of the each of the 
specified domains to identify weak and strong practises (OC4). 
o M2HCS can aggregate results from the individual domains to a 
suitable output that can be understood by all stakeholders (OC5). 




o Recommendations should be prioritised for improving the maturity 
based on available healthcare organisational resources (OC7). 
 The concise summary of the assessment activities is a guide for good 
practises and validation. M2HCS metrics support a qualitative and 
quantitative assessment of the cloud security in the healthcare 
organisation. These can be used for intra-organisational eHealth cloud 
security observation over time, progress made by the organisation’s 
policies, and the attainment of a goal recognised through the study of 
similar healthcare organisations’ cloud security proficiencies. 
 The maturity progresses through four levels, from reactive to compliant, 
proactive, and resilient. Maturity levels specify the advancement of 
maturity to achieve a considerably (highly) secure level of eHealth cloud 
system. Each level has a predefined set of characteristics. 
o Level 1 is characterised by having elementary practical eHealth 
cloud security implementations; it is unreliable and has ad hoc 
implementations. 
o Level 2 is characterised by having security mechanisms focussed 
on essential systems to provide a level of stability and perception 
that their systems are protected. 
o Level 3 is characterised by having security policies and procedures 




o Level 4 is characterised by having control over the security needs 
of the healthcare organisation. The priority of physical security is 
considered the same as of cloud security. 
 The validation authenticates the contribution of the proposed maturity 
model, M2HCS, as well as its usefulness, value, capability, and operational 
characteristics. A validation strategy was developed to provide a 
convincing argument for the model’s effectiveness and demonstrated its 
function within its proposed and realistic environment. It included the use 
of a case study, online surveys/interviews, and peer review from the 
scientific community. Results ascertained that M2HCS offers a suitable 
and strong progression method and is dependable when it comes to 
improving functioning healthcare cloud security.  
o Findings from the case study revealed all of the operational 
characteristics (OC) were attained, except OC5. The case study 
was assessed using the M2HCS metrics framework and formula to 
reveal an overall maturity level of 3. A list of steps was offered for 
improving their maturity.  
o Feedback from surveys and interviews revealed that the proposed 
model has the capability to follow its stages, through its proposed 
objectives and domains, amongst all the other operational 
characteristics attained. Further refinements were made to the 
model based on this feedback. 
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o Publications of research results in written form and reviews from the 
scientific community revealed that the research findings contributed 
knowledge to the field. 
o The prototype was used to attain the operational characteristic 
(OC5). 
 The proposed maturity model, M2HCS, has extensive potential to: 
o Support decision makers in their healthcare organisation’s cloud 
security practises assessment 
o Enlighten decision makers about their present security practises’ 
maturity 
o Educate decision makers about their strong and weak security 
practises 
o Provide recommendations to improve their weak practises  
o Prioritise their recommendations based on available resources  
7.3 Research Limitations 
Even though the thesis has fulfilled all research objectives, the researcher 
recognises some limitations which could be addressed in future work, especially 
considering that this research is the first study to focus on cloud security 
assessment for healthcare. Whilst the few preceding studies have been an 
advantage in developing a highly novel research this can also be considered a 
limitation. The research findings could have been improved with richer literature, 
resulting in more recognised metrics and models which would have reinforced 
the research direction for this thesis. On the other hand, the limited number of 
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preceding studies has given the researcher the chance to create some important 
practicalities in the area of eHealth cloud security assessment, with an invaluable 
contribution to knowledge.  
A different limitation is connected to the research methodology, mainly for the 
validation of the thesis. This is a known drawback in all research projects which 
employ surveys and is related to the bias in the participants’ responses and the 
limited sample population. In this research, the number of participants was limited 
for the project; however, it involved balanced representations. A larger sample 
population with more representations of the relevant participants would have 
strengthened the research findings.  
The last limitation of this study is associated with time and resource constraints; 
this paper had to be completed within a reasonable timeframe allocated for PhD 
research. If more time was allocated for the validation work, the level of detail 
obtained, particularly from the survey and interviews, would have been greater 
and of a wider scope. 
7.4 Recommendations for Further Research 
eHealth cloud security assessment and maturity models are a fairly novel 
phenomenon, and this research serves as an initial point for further study into this 
field. Many prospects have been discovered and are considered worthy of future 
research. Recommendations for this are as follow:  
 Demonstrate that the model can be used regardless of the differences 
amongst the eHealth cloud models (IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS). 
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 Extend the validation of the research findings in this thesis to all other 
healthcare organisations.  
 Investigate eHealth cloud security assessment for diverse case studies 
and practical demonstrations in many countries, which will allow 
opportunities for assessment amongst these nations and implementation 
of best practises. 
 Individual elements of the proposed model in this thesis could be a 
standalone research project, which allows for in-depth, e.g. IAM, 
assessment of eHealth cloud and end users’ trust assessment of eHealth 
cloud. 
 The proposed metric framework for assessment has a vast potential that 
can be extended to an automated framework system for customised 
eHealth cloud security assessment programmes, based on a healthcare 
organisation’s requirements. 
 The merging of the Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) with the cloud has 
been a subject of research interest. It is suggested that such a merging 
carries huge potential, along with some challenges too. There is an 
agreement that privacy and security are its key concerns. A major 
challenge is the lack of mature security for healthcare data within such a 
merged environment. This creates opportunities for important research to 





This chapter presented and discussed an overview of the study, from identifying 
the major factors limiting the adoption of eHealth cloud to reviewing cyber security 
maturity models that can be effective in assessing applications in eHealth cloud. 
It also discussed the development of the proposed model, M2HCS, and its 
validation strategies.  
Research contributions and findings were presented, along with the key 
contributions to this area of knowledge. The study, despite fulfilling all research 
objectives, has limitations that were identified and discussed. Lastly, 
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Appendix C - Survey Information Guide 
Dear <participant name>, 
Based on your expertise in the cloud security or healthcare ICT domains, I would 
like to invite you to participate in the validation of a novel Maturity Model for 
Healthcare Cloud Security System (MMHCSS). Should you accept, you will be 
expected to read through the attached information on the proposed maturity 
model and provide your feedback through the response document. All collected 
data relate to the appropriateness of the proposed model, rather than the level of 
maturity within your organisation. Any information you provide will be used in part 
fulfilment of PhD research at University of Plymouth, it will be kept anonymous. 
Your participation is voluntary and can be withdrawn should you choose to from 
the study. 
The duration of providing your feedback to the questions will be 15-20 minutes. 
Once completed, please email your completed response document to 
opeoluwa.balogun@plymouth.ac.uk. Should you prefer to provide your response 
via an interview instead, please reply to this email indicating your preference. The 
audio from the interview will be recorded in that case. This study has received 
ethical approval by the University of Plymouth Faculty of Science and 
Engineering Research Ethics & Integrity Committee. Please do not hesitate to 
contact me through opeoluwa.balogun@plymouth.ac.uk should you have any 






The diagram is a proposed Maturity Model for Healthcare Cloud Security 
(MMHCS), which consists of 4 maturity levels that apply to each of the following 
cloud security domains:  
- Incident Response Management (IRM),  
- Identity and Access Management (IAM),  
- Enterprise Risk Management (ERM),  
- Personnel Security (PeS),  
- Physical Security (PhS)  
Each domain includes a group of relevant objectives, which consist of processes 
and practices that could determine the maturity level in that domain. 





















Kindly complete the respondent’s pre-assessment details 
Kindly validate the model and each domain. Please refer to the related section 

















What is your background? Academia, Healthcare, Cloud security, Cybersecurity, Input as apply 
 
What are your years of experience at this background? Input the response in Numbers 
 
Do you have any experience in healthcare cloud/cyber-security? For how many 
years?  
Yes, No, 0 years - no experience, otherwise, input number of years 
 
What was the type of healthcare facility? General/Acute-care Hospital, Community Health 
centre, District Hospital, Specialised Hospital, Teaching Hospital, Clinics, Private healthcare centre, Input as 
apply 
 
Have you participated previously in cloud/cyber-security maturity assessment? 
Type of Assessment? 






MATURITY MODEL VALIDATION (Refer to Section 1 page 2) (Please provide 
responses with reasons) 
Are the domains relevant for the assessment of maturity within an organisation? 
 
 
Are the objectives relevant? 
 
 










INCIDENT RESPONSE MANAGEMENT (Refer to Section 2A page 5)  
 























IDENTITY AND ACCESS MANAGEMENT (Refer to Section 2B page 9)   
 

























ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT (Refer to Section 2C page 13)  
 























PERSONNEL SECURITY  (Refer to Section 2D page 17) 
 

























PHYSICAL SECURITY (Refer to Section 2E page 21) 
 

























Appendix E - Interview Summary 
Dear [Interviewee Title & Surname] 
LETTER OF INTRODUCTION & PURPOSE OF INTERVIEW 
I am Miss Opeoluwa Ore Balogun, a doctoral researcher of the School of 
Computing, Electronics and Mathematics at University of Plymouth. You have 
been approached to participate in this study as a result of your contribution to the 
[project name]. I would like to invite you to participate in a telephone interview 
that investigates the major access control challenges related to sharing and 
mobile rendering of cloud-based 3-dimensional medical radiological images in 
health care. 
Your participation will involve a semi-structured interview over telephone. The 
expected duration is one (1) hour. Subject to your approval, the interview may be 
recorded and a transcript will be provided for your approval. All data will be kept 
anonymous and the interview recording will not be published or shared with other 
parties. Anonymised quotes and the analysis of anonymised collected data will 
form the basis for future research publications. 
Please email opeoluwa.balogun@plymouth.ac.uk to confirm participation and to 
arrange an interview. At the same time, feel free to forward this invitation as 
appropriate to any other relevant parties that could contribute to the study. I 
sincerely hope that you will consider participating in this important effort to 
improve healthcare.   
This study has received ethical approval by the [faculty name]. Should you have 
any questions or concerns about the way the interview has been conducted, 
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please contact [name, email address of approver]. Please do not hesitate to 
contact me should you have any questions about this study.  
 
Sincerely, 
[Name, title, and institution of the interviewer] 
Telephone: 






Appendix F - Interview Question Guide 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
SECTION A: PROFESSIONAL DEMOGRAPHICS 
1. Cloud-based eHealth project 
a. Have you been involved in a cloud-based eHealth project {yes/no}: 
[___________] (If your answer is no, o to question 2a) 
 


















    
    
    
 
2. Cloud-based eHealth department 
a. Have you worked in a unit involved in cloud-based eHealth {yes/no}: 
[__________] (If your answer is no, go to question 3). 




b. If yes, please list the department(s) you have worked in  
 












    
    
    
SECTION B: TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF CLOUD-BASED eHEALTH 
3. Cloud-based eHealth are mostly used for distribution of records within the 
same institution, used seldom for sharing, and very rarely for outsourcing 
for second or expert opinions and cross-border use cases. Based on your 
expertise, what security reasons would you consider to be limiting its use? 
4. How would you rate the following security and performance challenges of 
cloud-based eHealth, on a scale of 1-5, where 1 has least impact and 5 































Systems and data 
availability 
      
Lack of interoperability       
Access control and 
authentication 
      
Data integrity       
Network Security       
Application 
performance in the 
cloud 
      
Bandwidth 
consumption limitations 
      
Latency constraints – 
Response time and 
throughput 
      
 
a. Could you provide more details to support your ratings? 




5. What do you consider the major access control (integrity and privacy) 
challenges of medical records faced in a cloud-based shared workflow? 
6. To secure communication in a shared workflow, the records are encrypted 
before being shared using encryption or the hash function. Which do you 
consider or suggest being best suited in a shared eHealth workflow based 
in the cloud? 
7. For secure, reliable and quick transmission over long distances and 
among different databases, very good access control mechanism(s) is/are 
required. Based on your expertise, which access control model(s) and 
policy(ies) is best suited for intra-organization, inter-organization and 
cross-border cloud-based teleradiology?  
a. To verify access rights to a health record in the cloud, login/password, 
smartcard, single sign on, fingerprint and certificates can be used. 
Which do you consider most efficient without interrupting clinical 
workflow? 
8. ‘Exception access’ in access control models increases the threat to patient 
privacy as it can be seen as a backdoor for misuse and also makes it 
infeasible to audit the access log for misuse. Do you consider ‘exception 
access’ a major technical security challenge? 
a. ‘Exception access’ is provided mainly because of the dynamic nature 
of healthcare. What solutions do you suggest that could help to improve 




9. Healthcare is a sector with dynamic needs, yet the access control solutions 
offered are based on models with static nature. Would you consider this 
as a limitation of present access control solutions in healthcare?  
10. What do you consider the major technical volume rendering challenges 
faced: a. when using a desktop? 
b. When using mobile device (mobile phone, PDA, tablet)? 
11. Apart from these technical security and performance challenges, are there 
any other major challenges/gaps in research especially concerning access 
control in cloud-based eHealth workflow? 
SECTION C: MANAGERIAL PROBLEMS OF CLOUD-BASED eHEALTH 
12. How would you rate the following management challenges in the adoption 
of cloud-based eHealth, on a scale of 1-5, where 1 has least impact and 5 
























Lack of trust in data 
security and privacy 
controls 




      
Manageability - vendor 
lock-in 
      
Legal regulations       
Standardisation, 
compliance and trust 
      
 
a. Could you provide more details to support your ratings? 
13. RxEye Cloud is one of the various cloud-based teleradiology platforms that 
is used in Europe, implementations mainly occurs in member states with 
a high concentration of networked Picture Archiving and Communication 
Systems (PACS), whilst usage of commercial teleradiology services in 
Europe is relatively limited, as language seems to be a limiting factor for 
further deployment of services and the demand for a Pan-European 
legislation, price regulation and quality assurance framework. 
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a. What do you consider to be the ‘things’ that could have been done 
differently to enhance adoption of cloud-based systems in eHealth? 
b. What is/are future directions for cloud-based eHealth systems? 
c. Kindly add any other information you consider very important to this 
survey. 
Assuming you had a budget to assign 
for the different factors influencing 
the adoption of cloud-based eHealth, 
including technical security, 
performance, and management 
challenges, how would you apportion 
it between them? Assign the 
percentage you would consider 
appropriate for each: 
 
Percentage Justification 
Technical Security   
Performance   
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